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Corporate Compliance and Criminality: Does the
Common Law Promote Culpable Blindness?
MICHAEL R. SIEBECKER & ANDREW M. BRANDES
Could corporate directors and officers face criminal liability for actions that
ostensibly comport with common law fiduciary duties? Answering this rather odd
question has gained paramount importance following the United States Justice
Department’s recent promulgation of aggressive new prosecution policies
targeting individual officers and directors responsible for major corporate
misconduct. In September 2015, former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates
disseminated an official policy memorandum entitled, Individual Accountability
for Corporate Wrongdoing. The Yates Memo instructs federal prosecutors to ferret
out and punish individual executives, officers, and board members who commit
crimes on behalf of the corporation. The recent indictment of several Volkswagen
executives connected with the auto emissions defeat device scandal represents a
prominent example of the new prosecutorial philosophy.
The shift in prosecutorial focus by the DOJ pursuant to the Yates Memo has
created a substantial jurisprudential rift between federal standards for criminal
prosecution of corporate agents and common law standards for fulfilling the
fiduciary duties of officers and directors. Prior to this new, zealous prosecution
program, the common law presumption embodied in the “business judgment rule”
regularly shielded directors and officers from liability for lax oversight practices,
even with criminal activity running rampant throughout the corporation. Under
the guidance of the Yates Memo, however, the government now holds directors
and officers to higher standards of oversight than the common law requires. The
implications of this jurisprudential rift between federal prosecutorial and common
law fiduciary standards are incredibly important. At the outset, the common law
standards surrounding the business judgment rule no longer provide sufficient
guidance for avoiding civil or criminal liability. In addition, were a director or
officer to face criminal sanctions for failed oversight, the very existence of
criminal liability would likely result in an exception to the business judgment
rule’s application. As a result, what might have been a minimally compliant
oversight system under the common law becomes actionable. Such bizarre
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circularity makes the common law jurisprudentially schizophrenic. To the extent
common law duties fail to align with federal standards, fiduciary duties regarding
corporate compliance risk becoming unworkable and ultimately irrelevant. This
Article argues that redirecting common law fiduciary duties to follow federal
prosecution standards will better ensure corporate accountability, reduce acts of
corporate misconduct, and promote trust in the capital markets.
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Corporate Compliance and Criminality: Does the
Common Law Promote Culpable Blindness?
MICHAEL R. SIEBECKER* & ANDREW M. BRANDES**
INTRODUCTION
Could corporate directors and officers face criminal liability for actions
that ostensibly comport with common law fiduciary duties? Answering this
rather odd question has gained paramount importance following the United
States Justice Department’s (“DOJ”) recent promulgation of aggressive
new prosecution policies targeting individual officers and directors
responsible for major corporate misconduct. Most recently, in September
2015, former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates disseminated an
official policy memorandum entitled, Individual Accountability for
Corporate Wrongdoing (the “Yates Memo”).1 The Yates Memo instructs
federal prosecutors to ferret out and punish individual executives, officers,
and board members who commit crimes on behalf of their corporations.2 In
the wake of several major banking scandals that undermined public
confidence in the capital markets and justice system for failing to hold
corporate executives responsible,3 the prosecutorial policy shift embraced
in the Yates Memo stemmed from the basic realization that
*
Professor of Law, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. B.A., Yale; J.D., LL.M., Ph.D.,
Columbia. The author wishes to thank Tim J. Thein for his thoughtful criticism and kind support.
**
B.A., University of Colorado; J.D., University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. The author
wishes to thank Alana for her timely encouragement and thoughtful advice as well as his parents, Don
and Patty, for their lifelong support of his interests and endeavors.
1
Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Individual
Accountability for Corp. Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/
download [https://perma.cc/L762-ZQ3R]; see also Individual Accountability, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/dag/individual-accountability [https://perma.cc/23AB-EKPD] (detailing the six
steps discussed in the Yates Memo to strengthen pursuit of individuals in corporate wrongdoing cases).
2
See Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the N.Y.C. Bar
Association White Collar Crime Conference (May 10, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
deputy-attorney-general-sally-q-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-city-bar-association [https://perma.
cc/X83L-PLZC] (“[H]olding accountable the people who committed the wrongdoing is essential if we
are truly going to deter corporate misdeeds, have a real impact on corporate culture and ensure that the
public has confidence in our justice system. We cannot have a different system of justice—or the
perception of a different system of justice—for corporate executives than we do for everyone else.”).
3
See Editorial, No Crime, No Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/no-crime-no-punishment.html [https://perma.cc/
4SF6-BJ7P] (discussing how no banks or executives would face criminal charges for the financial crisis
and how this eroded public confidence in the law); see also Sarah White, Not One Top Wall Street
Executive Has Been Convicted of Criminal Charges Related to 2008 Crisis, HUFFPOST (Sept. 13, 2013,
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[c]orporations can only commit crimes through
flesh-and-blood people. It’s only fair that the people who are
responsible for committing those crimes be held accountable.
The public needs to have confidence that there is one system
of justice and it applies equally regardless of whether that
crime occurs on a street corner or in a boardroom.4
By holding individuals to account for corporate criminality, the DOJ hoped
to restore a crumbling public trust.5
Some initially remained skeptical of the impact of the Yates Memo on
criminal prosecutions of individual corporate actors,6 but little doubt about
the effect of the policy shift remained following the arrests of several
Volkswagen executives connected with the auto emissions defeat device
(“Defeat Device”) scandal.7 In January 2017, Volkswagen agreed to plead
guilty on three criminal felony counts and pay $4.3 billion in fines
7:50
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/13/wall-street-prosecution_n_3919792.html
[https://perma.cc/M7TQ-XTAM] (comparing various countries’ handling of criminal charges after the
crisis and what regulations led to the difference); Aruna Viswanatha, Elizabeth Warren Says DOJ and
SEC Are Lousy at Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2016, 3:14 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/
2016/01/29/elizabeth-warren-doj-and-sec-are-lousy-at-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/VM2S-RVXH]
(detailing Elizabeth Warren’s comments on weak enforcement by the SEC).
4
William D. Cohan, Justice Department Shift on White-Collar Crime Is Long Overdue, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/business/dealbook/justice-dept-shift-onwhite-collar-crime-is-long-overdue.html [https://perma.cc/5RPX-R8B5].
5
Devlin Barrett, Justice Department Renews Focus on White-Collar Cases, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
10, 2015, 9:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-renews-focus-on-white-collarcases-1441849429 [https://perma.cc/C53W-VAV2].
6
See OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, RIGGED JUSTICE: 2016 HOW WEAK
ENFORCEMENT LETS CORPORATE OFFENDERS OFF EASY 4 (Jan. 2016), https://www.warren.senate.gov/
files/documents/Rigged_Justice_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T4N-MHAN] (“Despite this rhetoric,
DOJ civil and criminal settlements—and enforcement actions by other federal agencies—continually
fail to impose any serious threat of punishment on corporate offenders.”); U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE
FOR LEGAL REFORM, DOJ’S NEW THRESHOLD FOR “COOPERATION” 4–5 (May 2016),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/YatesMemoPaper_Pages_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AEA8-B7A5]; David Woodcock & John T. Sullivan, Individuals in the Cross Hairs,
What This Means for Directors, JONES DAY (Mar. 2016), http://www.jonesday.com/individuals-in-thecross-hairs-what-this-means-for-directors-03-10-2016/ [https://perma.cc/75NS-YCEL] (“The Yates
Memo has the potential to affect many aspects of corporate investigations and prosecutions, but it does
not change the standards for proving criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt, which is a serious
hurdle to proving individual liability. Nevertheless, the government's focus on individual liability
creates additional risks.”); Rena Steinzor, White-Collar Reset: The DOJ’s Yates Memo and its Potential
to Protect Health, Safety, and the Environment, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 39, 66–67 (2017).
7
See Hiroko Tabuchi et al., 6 Volkswagen Executives Charged as Company Pleads Guilty in
Emissions Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11
/business/volkswagen-diesel-vw-settlement-charges-criminal.html
[https://perma.cc/3VQU-PNHQ]
(reporting criminal charges announced by federal prosecutors in the Volkswagen emissions cheating
scandal); Jack Ewing et al., Volkswagen Executive’s Trip to U.S. Allowed F.B.I. to Pounce, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/business/volkswagen-emissions-scandal-oliverschmidt.html [https://perma.cc/9XDW-STE6] (reporting the arrest of Oliver Schmidt in connection
with Volkswagen’s emissions cheating).
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resulting from its use of an emissions-cheating device installed in
thousands of diesel vehicles8 and from obstructing justice in lying about
the scheme.9 In addition to securing the corporation’s confession of guilt,
the DOJ announced criminal charges against six Volkswagen executives
for their individual roles in perpetuating the Defeat Device fraud.10 Driving
home the new focus on individual culpability, Deputy Attorney General
Yates stated, “[t]his wasn’t simply the action of some faceless,
multinational corporation. . . . This conspiracy involved flesh-and-blood
individuals . . . . We’ve followed the evidence—from the showroom to the
boardroom—and it brought us to the people whose indictments we
announce today.”11
Many suspect that the government will use each arrest to climb farther
up the corporate criminal ladder.12 Although five of the individuals remain
in Germany,13 the F.B.I. arrested one executive in Florida, Oliver Schmidt,
who previously served as Volkswagen’s top emissions compliance officer
in the United States.14 Federal prosecutors charged Schmidt with eleven
felony counts for which he faced up to 169 years in prison, if found
guilty.15 Perhaps as a result of such pressure, in early August 2017,
Schmidt pleaded guilty to two felony counts.16 Although sentencing will
not occur until December 2017, Schmidt now faces seven years in prison,
subsequent deportation, and a fine of up to $400,000.17 Although it’s
unclear whether Schmidt will serve as a governmental witness against
other Volkswagen executives as part of his plea bargain, because Mr.
Schmidt “warned executives in Germany that the company could face
8

Tabuchi et al., supra note 7. For a detailed discussion of the Defeat Device Scandal, see Guilbert
Gates et al., How Volkswagen’s “Defeat Devices” Worked, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html?mcubz=0
[https://perma.cc/P7AF-4VCP] (last updated Mar. 16, 2017).
9
Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Volkswagen AG Agrees to Plead
Guilty and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six Volkswagen Executives and
Employees are Indicted in Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S. Emissions Tests (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion-criminal-andcivil-penalties-six [https://perma.cc/NGR5-6EFX].
10
Tabuchi et al., supra note 7.
11
Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 9.
12
For a general discussion of the Yates Memo’s incentives to elicit information about higher
ranking corporate executives, see Elizabeth E. Joh and Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch:
The New DOJ Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51 (2015).
13
Bill Vlasic, Volkswagen Executive Pleads Guilty in Diesel Emissions Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/business/volkswagen-diesel-oliver-schmidt.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/VB6U-F9T8].
14
Id.
15
Nick Carey, Volkswagen Executive Pleads Guilty in U.S. Emissions Cheating Case, REUTERS
(Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkwwagen-emissions-idUSKBN1AK1OY
[https://perma.cc/B76G-MD4D].
16
Vlasic, supra note 13.
17
Carey, supra note 15.
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criminal charges for its action,” prosecutors hope he will be valuable in
ongoing investigations of higher-ranking corporate officials regarding their
own criminal complicity.19 Along with the information received from a
Volkswagen software engineer who pleaded guilty to conspiracy in
September 2016,20 the plea agreement with Schmidt emboldened the
Department of Justice to redouble its pledge that “Schmidt, along with
each and every official involved in this emissions scandal, will be held
fully accountable for their actions by the Department of Justice as this
investigation continues.”21
The DOJ’s targeting of individual wrongdoers responsible for
perpetrating—or casting a blind eye to—Volkswagen’s fraudulent scheme
heralds a new era of heightened scrutiny of directors and officers regarding
corporate oversight practices. Prior to this new, zealous prosecution
program, the common law presumption embodied in the “business
judgment rule”22 regularly shielded directors and officers from liability for
lax oversight practices, even with criminal activity running rampant
throughout the corporation.23 Except in cases involving fraud, illegality,
conflicts of interest, or gross negligence,24 courts would presume the
decisions of corporate managers comported with their fiduciary duties
owed to the corporation and its shareholders.25 As a result, shareholders
seeking redress for failed corporate oversight would not be able to recover

18

Ewing et al., supra note 7.
Id.
20
Samantha Masunaga & Del Quentin Wilber, VW Engineer from California Pleads Guilty to
PM),
Conspiracy
in
Emissions Scandal,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016, 2:55
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-volkswagen-engineer-20160909-snap-story.html
[https://www.perma.cc/F89X-7EPG].
21
Carey, supra note 15 (quoting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jean Williams); see also
Masunaga & Wilber, supra note 20 (predicting that Volkswagen employees cooperating with the U.S.
Department of Justice means others will be charged); Gates et. al., supra note 8 (discussing the
Volkswagen internal response).
22
For a general discussion of the business judgment rule under Delaware law, see
Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate Efficiency and Political
Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 132 (2014);
Michael R. Siebecker, The Duty of Care and Data Control Systems in the Wake of Sarbanes-Oxley,
84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 821, 825–26 (2010).
23
See, e.g., BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS, 17, 193 (2014) (describing how prosecutors may reveal malfeasance but subsequent
punishments will rarely reform a firm’s management).
24
Michael R. Siebecker, Political Insider Trading, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2717, 2746 (2017).
25
See id. (noting the exceptions to the business judgment rule); Edward B. Rock &
Michael L. Wachter, Islands for Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1668–69 (2001) (describing how courts presume that managers serve
fiduciary duties and shareholders except when conflicts of interest arise).
19
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even civil damages absent application of one of the business judgment rule
exceptions.26
With respect to the duty of corporate managers to implement effective
monitoring mechanisms to identify and stave off corporate wrongdoing,
Delaware common law—which governs the vast majority of public
companies in the United States—sets an incredibly low hurdle for directors
and officers to overcome liability. Two prominent Delaware Supreme
Court decisions, In re Caremark International27 and Stone v. Ritter,28 set
forth the managerial baby steps directors and officers need to take to evade
culpability.
In Caremark, shareholders of a health-care company brought a
derivative suit alleging directors violated their fiduciary duties in failing to
uncover an illegal kickback scheme used by company employees that
eventually led the company to plead guilty to felony criminal charges.29
In its determination that the board did not breach its fiduciary duties
despite failing to detect and prevent the criminal misconduct, the Delaware
Court of Chancery held “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board
to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exits—will establish the lack
of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”30 In Stone, where
shareholders of a bank claimed its directors failed to identify and prevent
corporate employees from violating federal anti-money-laundering laws,
the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Caremark standard.31
Articulating a willful ignorance of “red flags” exception, the Court added
that liability could also arise when, after implementing a minimally
compliant information gathering system, a board “consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”32
The “utter failure to attempt” threshold in Caremark and the
“red flags” exception in Stone offer great insulation to officers and
directors in the face of corporate criminality. At least as the contours of
common law fiduciary duties are articulated in Delaware—by far the most
important and influential corporate jurisdiction in the United States—
corporate officers and directors rarely faced personal civil, let alone

26

See Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability Within the Corporate
Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 215–16, 218–20, 222–23 (2010) (describing the business
judgment rule exceptions and the difficulty shareholders face when pursuing these options).
27
In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
28
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
29
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961–62.
30
Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
31
Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
32
Id.
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33

criminal, liability for corporate misdeeds. Quite to the contrary,
potentially liable directors and officers have generally enjoyed a cozy
relationship with government prosecutors.34 While individual executives
certainly face intense media scrutiny in the midst of corporate scandals,35
those same high-ranking corporate agents receive significant incentives for
identifying institutional corporate wrongdoing in exchange for leniency
regarding their individual complicity in the corporate crime.36
The shift in prosecutorial focus by the DOJ pursuant to the Yates
Memo has created a substantial jurisprudential rift between federal
standards for criminal prosecution of corporate agents and common law
standards for fulfilling the fiduciary duties of officers and directors. As a
result, the coziness between the government and ostensibly complicit
corporate actors may indeed have come to an end. The changing tides
result not simply from some attitudinal shift. Instead, the government now
holds directors and officers to higher standards of oversight than the
common law requires. Leniency for individual transgressions no longer
comes with simple cooperation, but instead requires complete confession
and compatriot implication. For instance, pursuant to the U.S. Attorney’s
Manual that guides DOJ prosecutions,
[compliance programs must be] established by corporate
management to prevent and detect misconduct and to ensure
that corporate activities are conducted in accordance with
applicable criminal and civil laws, regulations, and rules . . . .
However, the existence of a compliance program is not
sufficient, in and of itself, to justify not charging a
corporation for criminal misconduct undertaken by its
officers, directors, employees, or agents.37
Moreover, the Yates Memo eliminates or severely restricts former
officer and director safe havens such as corporate cooperation credits,
individual plea-bargaining agreements, and the prioritization of
prosecutions of companies over those that target individuals.38
The implications of this jurisprudential rift between federal
prosecutorial and common law fiduciary standards are incredibly
33
See OFFICE OF SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing the importance of
holding individuals accountable for corporate crime); Nees, supra note 26, at 215–24 (discussing the
current state of director oversight liability).
34
Nees, supra note 26, at 215–24.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY MANUAL 9-28.800
(revised Nov. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecutionbusiness-organizations #9-28.800 [https://www.perma.cc/JLP5-3QYT].
38
Id.
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important. At the outset, for those directors and officers at the vast majority
of public companies incorporated in Delaware, Caremark and Stone do not
provide reliable guidance for avoiding civil or criminal liability. Those
cases articulate the contours of corporate fiduciary duties far out of line
with what federal prosecutors demand. In light of the Yates Memo,
corporate counsel suggest that public company directors implement
corporate compliance systems far more stringent than required under
Delaware common law.39 In addition, were a director or officer to face
criminal sanctions for failed oversight, the very existence of criminal
liability would likely result in an exception to the business judgment rule’s
application. As a result, what might have been a minimally compliant
oversight system under the common law becomes actionable. Such bizarre
circularity makes Delaware law jurisprudentially schizophrenic. To the
extent Delaware common law duties fail to align with federal standards,
the fiduciary duties surrounding corporate compliance risk becoming
unworkable and ultimately irrelevant. Only by bending to match the reality
of federal compliance standards can Delaware common law fiduciary
duties remain relevant for guiding corporate managers.
To assess why Delaware common law fiduciary duties must change to
reflect heightened prosecutorial standards, Part I of this Article,
“The Common Law of Compliance,” discusses the evolution of lax
common law standards regarding corporate compliance that have provided
ample protection to officers and directors even in cases of criminal
wrongdoing. Part II, “Corporate Criminality in the Crosshairs,” describes
the incremental shift in DOJ prosecutorial focus towards individual
culpability resulting from numerous high-profile corporate scandals and
increasing public demands for accountability. Part III, “Directorial Duties
Redirected,” outlines three potential alternatives to Delaware’s current
business judgment rule standards that would align common law fiduciary
duties with the Yates Memo’s directives. Part IV, “Implications,” explores
a variety of potential advantages and drawbacks to changing common law
standards to comport with the reality of current prosecution policies.
Finally, the Article concludes that redirecting Delaware common law
fiduciary duties to follow federal prosecution standards will better ensure
corporate accountability, reduce acts of corporate misconduct, and promote
trust in the capital markets.
39

See, e.g., Michael W. Peregrine, Beyond Caremark: Individual and Corporate Liability
Considerations, COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 7, 2016), https://wp.nyu.edu/
compliance_enforcement/2016/12/07/beyond-caremark-individual-and-corporate-liabilityconsiderations [https://www.perma.cc/82KJ-4M65]; Michael Volkov, Corporate Directors in the
Enforcement Cross-Hairs, CORRUPTION, CRIME & COMPLIANCE (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://blog.volkovlaw.com/2016/03/corporate-directors-enforcement-cross-hairs/
[https://www.perma.cc/8JFG-8TPQ]; Woodcock & Sullivan, supra note 6.
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THE COMMON LAW OF COMPLIANCE

The Delaware court system has come to be known as the “Mother
Court of corporate law.”40 More than 60% of Fortune 500 companies are
incorporated in Delaware41 and since 2003, the state held nearly 75% of all
initial public offerings in the United States.42 In fact, the number of public
companies incorporated in Delaware is thirteen times more than the
number of public companies incorporated in California, which is striking
given that there are forty-three times more public companies headquartered
in California than there are in Delaware.43 With this established
prominence in the corporate field, Delaware offers significant and unique
benefits for those companies that incorporate in that jurisdiction.44
One of the allures for these companies incorporating in Delaware is the
manner in which the common law offers protection for directors and
officers under the business judgment rule.45 The business judgment rule
extends liability protection to officers and directors that act in good faith if
their decisions are ultimately shown to be unsound or erroneous.46 The rule
is based on the idea that business decisions should not be subject to
after-the-fact second-guessing by judicial bodies because it would prevent
officers and directors from taking the risks necessary to engage in
business.47 In Delaware, the business judgment rule has been defined to

40
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv’s, Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990); Jerue v. Millett,
66 P.3d 736, 745 (Alaska 2003); Stephen A. Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance
Litigation: Section 220 Demands, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1287, 1287–88 (2006).
41
Robert Hennelly, Is Delaware Home to a “Grand Corruption”?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-delaware-home-to-a-grand-corruption/
[https://www.perma.cc/
Y8XS-S562].
42
BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK § 3:1 (2016) (citing William
B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, Manufacturing Mystery: A Response to Professors Carney and
Shepherd’s “The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success,” 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 99
(2009)).
43
Id. (citing Robert Anderson IV & Jeffrey Mannis, The Delaware Delusion, 93 N.C.L. REV.
1049, 1055 (2015)).
44
See Alana Semuels, The Tiny State Whose Laws Affect Workers Everywhere, THE ATLANTIC
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/corporate-governance/502487/
[https://www.perma.cc/A6K6-EG7H] (explaining that corporations want to incorporate in the state of
Delaware because the state’s Court of Chancery is favorable to business).
45
Id.
46
Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L.
REV. 521, 526–27 (2013).
47
McMillan, supra note 46 (citing In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009)); see also
Alex Righi, Shareholders on Shaky Ground: Section 271’s Remaining Loophole, 108 NW. U.L. REV.
1451, 1464–65 (2014) (citing E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key
Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1413 (2005)) (“Delaware courts view the business judgment
rule as ‘a presumption that courts will not interfere with, or second guess, decision making by
directors,’ unless there is clear cause to do so.”).

398

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:2

“protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power
granted to Delaware directors.”48
For the purposes of this article, the application of the business
judgment rule in the context of business oversight and compliance is
especially important and will serve as the primary topic of analysis. The
Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in In re Caremark International in
1996 and the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Stone v. Ritter in 2006
exemplify the business judgment rule’s benefits for directors and officers
in relation to business oversight.
Caremark and Stone also represent an extremely low threshold for
directors and officers49 to achieve in order to avail themselves of the
protections from liability under the business judgment rule for violations of
state law. This standard permits those individuals to mount only minimal
efforts in order to qualify for oversight protection and the benefit of
Delaware’s generous business judgment rule protection. However, the
Yates Memo represents a ground shift that demands much more from
directors and officers than ever before. While the Yates Memo relates to
federal enforcement authority, it is nevertheless important in guiding a
director’s or officer’s actions in performing oversight duties prior to any
regulatory investigation. The Yates Memo is also important to determining
a director’s or officer’s ability to avoid personal liability under both state
and federal law. Accordingly, reviewing the current standards from
Delaware courts in Caremark and Stone lays the foundation for an
examination of the differences between the current, more lenient common
law standard and the markedly more demanding investigatory and
enforcement standards announced in the Yates Memo.

48
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1975); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1747–48 (2006).
49
It is important to note that the holdings in Caremark and Stone are not explicitly applicable to
both directors and officers. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006) (applying standards of
oversight to director conduct); In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (articulating
only the directors’ duty of care standard without specific reference to officers). However, the Delaware
Supreme Court held in 2009 that the Caremark standards of oversight apply not only to directors, but
also to officers. Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009); see also Verity Winship,
Jurisdiction Over Corporate Officers and the Incoherence of Implied Consent, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
1171, 1173 n.6 (2013) (citing Gantler, 965 A.2d at 708–09) (explaining that Gantler was the first case
in which the equivalence of director and officer duty was explicitly stated by a court); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to
Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865, 876 (2005) (arguing that the policies underlying the business
judgment rule apply with “equal force” to both directors and officers); Darren Guttenberg, Note,
Waiving Farewell Without Saying Goodbye: The Waiver of Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability
Companies in Delaware, and the Call for Mandatory Disclosure, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 869, 877 n.31
(2013) (reviewing case law suggesting that directors and officers are afforded the same presumption of
competence under the business judgment rule).

2018]

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND CRIMINALITY

399

A. The Caremark Approach
In re Caremark International is widely considered to be the most
important decision on directors’ liability for failing to act in accordance
with their compliance and business oversight obligations.50 Caremark
involved a health-care company’s compliance with health-care regulations
and its alleged involvement with “kickback” payments given to physicians
in exchange for referrals to Caremark facilities.51 The alleged kickback
scheme, if substantiated, would have violated Caremark’s policy against
“quid pro quo” payments, as well as federal statutes which prohibited
health-care providers from making payments for referral of Medicare or
Medicaid patients.52 The company previously issued an internal manual to
govern employees entering into contracts with physicians and hospitals.53
The manual noted that no payments would be made in exchange or as a
reward for referrals, but it was not clear whether other quid pro quo
benefits were explicitly prohibited by the internal policy.54
Eventually, the DOJ and the Department of Health and Human
Services Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) investigated Caremark
for illegal kickback payments.55 The Caremark board then began a review
of its internal policies and procedures, eventually producing a revised
guide on contractual relationships with physicians—the updated guide
established a policy of increased managerial oversight for these
agreements, and added approval mechanisms accordingly.56 The board
received reports on the investigation, continued to institute new policies,
and increased its management supervision.57 However, the regulatory
investigations culminated in a federal grand jury indictment charging
Caremark and two of its officers with violating federal anti-kickback
statutes.58 According to the indictment, the alleged kickback payments
continued even after the board was alerted to the risks, in spite of its
increased focus on compliance and internal training.59 Caremark eventually
settled various state and federal matters against it60 by paying significant
50
See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 10:4
(3d ed. 2016); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS STRUCTURES 224 (3d ed. 2010) (describing
Caremark as the “‘seminal modern case on directors’ liability for failure to act”).
51
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 961–62.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 962.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 963.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 963–64.
59
See id. (describing how the allegations of the indictment spanned the years in which Caremark
was increasing its oversight and control over physician contracts).
60
Id. at 965–66.
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61

criminal and civil fines. The matter at issue for the court at trial was
whether the proposed settlement of claims against Caremark was “fair to
the corporation and its absent shareholders.”62 However, the underlying
issues of importance to matters of corporate governance were: (1) under
which standard Caremark’s directors and officers should be evaluated; and
(2) whether these directors and officers failed to adequately supervise the
conduct of the company’s employees or institute corrective measures that
ultimately resulted in fines and penalties.63 In their complaint, shareholders
alleged that the directors breached their “duty of attention or care” by
allowing the situation to “develop and continue; [resulting in] enormous
legal liability” stemming from their failure to actively monitor corporate
performance.64
Ultimately, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the proposed
settlement was fair for the company and the absent shareholders.65
However, more important to this analysis, the court held that when it
pertains to board oversight, “only a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exits—will establish the lack
of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”66 In addition, the
court also expanded upon its prior decision in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
stating that “absent grounds to suspect deception, neither corporate boards
nor senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming
the integrity of employees and the honesty of their dealings on the
company’s behalf.”67
The holding in Caremark is extremely significant because of its
instructive value for directors and officers in establishing their companies’
oversight and compliance systems. By the decision’s own terms, “[only] an
utter failure to attempt” to oversee a company’s employees will result in
liability for directors under the Delaware business judgment rule.68
Further, even in cases where the company is subject to criminal and civil
discipline, the court will defer to the minimalist oversight functions that are
instituted as sufficient, resulting in a significant benefit for high-level
employees.69 The court’s standard requires no qualitative analysis of the
61

Id. at 965 n.10.
Id. at 961.
63
Id. at 967, 970–71.
64
Id. at 967.
65
Id. at 972.
66
Id. at 971.
67
Id. at 969 (citing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130–31 (Del. 1963))
(holding that the Graham decision stood for the proposition stated above based on the court’s review in
Caremark).
68
Id. at 971.
69
Id.
62
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oversight measures, but simply offers a binary, “all or nothing” standard in
which any effort to oversee the business operations is generally
sufficient.70
The decision to insulate directors and officers from personal liability
based on these facts is even more problematic considering the federal
settlement Caremark agreed to the year before the decision was announced.
As part of a separate series of settlements with the DOJ, the Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”), Caremark agreed to make various payments totaling
approximately $250 million.71 Of that amount, $161 million of the
settlement accounted for criminal fines, civil restitution, and damages for
Caremark’s actions.72 At the time, it was the second-largest settlement ever
recorded in the health-care industry.73
The DOJ would ultimately indict four Caremark employees, 74
including its head of sales and marketing.75 While these four employees
were later acquitted, they remained employed at Caremark during the legal
proceedings and kept their jobs after the trial.76 As a result of the
indictments’ announcement in August of 1994, Caremark’s publicly-traded
shares dropped ten percentage points.77 Overall, the impact on Caremark
was significant to its day-to-day business operations and its shareholders’

70

Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. The “utter failure to attempt” standard outlined in Caremark
permits companies to skirt qualitative analysis beyond answering the binary question of whether there
was an attempt to provide oversight or not. This results in an “all or nothing” compromise where a
company that engages in a form of oversight will benefit from the business judgment rule and vice
versa.
71
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Caremark to Pay $161 Million in Fraud and Kickback
Cases
(June
16,
1995),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/Pre_96/June95/342.txt.html
[https://www.perma.cc/Q82K-KS2X].
72
Id.
73
Kathleen Day, Drug Executives Cleared in Kickback Case, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 1995),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1995/10/04/drug-executives-cleared-in-kickbackcase/586dcb19-5ef9-4da3-baa0-2f030c60fb9a/?utm_term=.732f32f3fb9575b [https://www.perma.cc/
QAZ5-UKN6].
74
It is important to note that no officer-level executives or directors were indicted. See Jan
Crawford Greenburg, Healthy Penalties in Caremark Fraud Case, CHI. TRIB. (June 17, 1995),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-06-17/news/9506170105_1_health-care-fraud-caremarkinternational-government-medical-programs [https://www.perma.cc/622L-YXNZ]; see also Hillary A.
Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 726 (2007) (“Importantly, no senior
officers of directors were cited for wrongdoing . . . . ”).
75
Day, supra note 73.
76
Id.
77
See Milt Freudenheim, Caremark Is Indicted in Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/05/business/company-news-caremark-is-indicted-inkickbacks.html?mcubz=1 [https://www.perma.cc/X4CK-FFN3] (“Caremark's shares fell $2.375 . . . to
$21.125, in heavy trading on the New York Stock Exchange . . . .”).
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financial interests, yet none of the executives or officers were found
individually culpable for their acts or omissions by the Delaware court.78
While the chronology of the case shows that the DOJ’s indictments
took place prior to Delaware’s legal proceedings, the fact that the outcomes
were so different is telling. The court’s decision offers little analysis on the
Caremark board’s oversight actions aside from a brief mention of the
board’s awareness of the pending investigations and the finding that once
the issues were identified, the board took action by updating its guides and
increasing its policy to demand more regular reporting and oversight on the
matter to supervisors.79 For ten years after the decision in Caremark,
directors and officers took solace in the fact that the business judgment rule
would protect them if they mounted even minimal efforts at oversight.
Then, the Delaware Supreme Court offered its decision in Stone and
further galvanized these protections.80
B. Stone: Reaffirming Caremark and Then Some
A decade after Caremark, the Delaware Supreme Court announced its
decision in Stone, which clarified a number of lingering questions about
director oversight liability.81 The case came to the Delaware Supreme
Court as an appeal from the Chancery Court’s decision dismissing a
shareholder’s derivative complaint against current and former directors for
their failure to stop a money-laundering scheme that resulted in significant
penalties and fines incurred by the defendant banking corporation,
AmSouth.82
The facts of the case were largely unimportant in Stone and the
Delaware Supreme Court apportioned the majority of the opinion to
analyzing the Chancery Court’s prior decision in the Caremark case.83
Ultimately, the court held that the Chancery Court’s holding in Caremark
reflected the correct standard for boards of directors seeking business
78

Sale, supra note 74, at 726–27.
See In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 963 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Caremark’s Board took several
additional steps consistent with an effort to assure compliance with company policies concerning the
ARPL and the contractual forms in the Guide. In April 1992, Caremark published a fourth revised
version of its Guide apparently designed to assure that its agreements either complied with the ARPL
and regulations or excluded Medicare and Medicaid patients altogether. In addition, in September
1992, Caremark instituted a policy requiring its regional officers, Zone Presidents, to approve each
contractual relationship entered into by Caremark with a physician.”).
80
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372–73 (Del. 2006).
81
Andrew D. Appleby & Matthew D. Montaigne, Three’s Company: Stone v. Ritter and the
Improper Characterization of Good Faith in the Fiduciary Duty “Triad,” 62 ARK. L. REV. 431,
431–33, 437 (2009) (discussing how the longstanding debate was settled and observing that “[t]he
Stone court finally cleared up some doctrinal issues when it explicitly stated that good faith is not a
freestanding duty on the level of care and loyalty”).
82
Stone, 911 A.2d at 364–65, 373.
83
Id. at 364–65, 367–70.
79
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judgment rule protection in relation to oversight liability. In adopting the
Caremark rule, the court expanded its position on the necessary conditions
for director oversight.85 In order to be culpable under a director oversight
theory, a director must either: (1) utterly fail to implement any reporting
information system or controls as stated under Caremark; or (2) “having
implemented such a system or controls, consciously fail[] to monitor or
oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of
risks or problems requiring their attention.”86 Importantly, the court held
that in either case, the directors must know that they are “not discharging
their fiduciary obligations” in order to be liable for failing to provide
proper oversight.87 Only then, when “the directors fail to act in the face of
a known duty to act . . . demonstrating a conscious disregard for their
responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge
that fiduciary obligation in good faith.”88
In applying this “red flags” exception to the case, the Stone court found
that the plaintiffs did not plead the existence of any facts that otherwise
indicated that the AmSouth directors were aware that AmSouth’s internal
controls were incapable of stopping the illegal activity.89 The court noted
the Chancery Court’s findings in the case were correct: the directors’
oversight actions were sufficient and their failure to affirmatively detect
the illegal activity did not meet the Caremark standard for culpability.90
Therefore, the directors were not personally liable for the
money-laundering scheme that occurred under their watch and they
executed their obligations in fulfillment of the proper standards.91
In sharp contrast to the findings of the Delaware Supreme Court in
Stone, the U.S. Attorney’s Office (“USAO”), Federal Reserve’s Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), and the Alabama Banking
Department found that AmSouth’s board did indeed fall short when
executing its oversight responsibilities.92 The federal government found
that AmSouth relied on misrepresentations by the actors involved in the
money-laundering scheme and failed to file the requisite documents
according to federal law.93
While the USAO opted to not hold any individual officer or director
culpable specifically, FinCEN found that “AmSouth’s [compliance]
84

Id. at 369–70.
Id. at 370.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 370–71.
90
Id. at 372–73.
91
Id. at 373.
92
Id. at 366.
93
Id.
85
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program lacked adequate board and management oversight” and “reporting
to management for the purposes of monitoring and oversight of compliance
activities was materially deficient.”94 Nevertheless, the government did not
fine or sanction AmSouth’s individual directors at the conclusion of its
investigation.95 Instead, it opted to pursue fines and penalties against the
corporation itself.96
C. The Legacy of Caremark and Stone
When considered against the Delaware courts’ standards, the facts in
Caremark and Stone represent instances where the board exceeded the
requisite obligations to qualify for the protection of the business judgment
rule.97 However, both of the defendant companies suffered meaningful
losses in the related civil and criminal settlements under federal law.98
For shareholders, the outcomes in these proceedings stand as an affront to
the very essence of what directors and officers are charged to do.99
According to the investigatory outcomes from the federal government,
these individuals failed to identify wrongdoing and act in the best interest
of the shareholders.100
94

Id. at 366.
Id. at 365.
96
Id.
97
See In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 971–72 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“Here the record supplies
essentially no evidence that the director defendants were guilty of a sustained failure to exercise their
oversight function. To the contrary, insofar as I am able to tell on this record, the corporation’s
information systems appear to have represented a good faith attempt to be informed of relevant facts. If
the directors did not know the specifics of the activities that lead to the indictments, they cannot be
faulted.”); Stone, 911 A.2d at 372–73 (“[T]he Board received and approved relevant policies and
procedures, delegated to certain employees and departments the responsibility for filing SARs and
monitoring compliance, and exercised oversight by relying on periodic reports from them. Although
there ultimately may have been failures by employees to report deficiencies to the Board, there is no
basis for an oversight claim seeking to hold the directors personally liable for such failures by the
employees.”).
98
See supra text accompanying notes 71–73 (describing the $161 settlement as the second largest
settlement in the health-care industry); see also Stone, 911 A.2d at 365 (noting AmSouth and AmSouth
Bank paid out $40 million and $10 million in civil penalties).
99
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good Faith
and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 560–61 (2008) (citing Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment
Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1494 (1984)) (noting
that “most of what boards do ‘does not consist of taking affirmative action on individual matters’ but
rather consists of a ‘continuing flow of supervisory process’”); id. (citing Jonathan L. Johnson et. al.,
Boards of Directors: A Review and Research Agenda, 22 J. MGMT. 409, 411 (1996)) (finding that
“[m]onitoring the performance of corporate management is not just one of the board’s three principal
functions, it is, arguably, prima inter pares”).
100
Stone, 911 A.2d at 366 (“FinCEN found that AmSouth violated the suspicious activity
reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, and that . . . AmSouth has been in violation of the
anti-money-laundering program requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. Among FinCEN’s specific
determinations were its conclusions that AmSouth’s [AML compliance] program lacked adequate
board and management oversight, and that reporting to management for the purposes of monitoring and
95
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Yet the Delaware court found that these same individuals properly
executed their business oversight obligations.101 For directors and officers,
the ability to avoid personal liability when their company and company’s
shareholders suffer financial losses is problematic. Perhaps these officers
and directors eventually lost their positions or had difficulties in securing
future jobs from the reputational impact of the scandals, but by that time,
the damage to the companies and shareholders was already done. To find
that these individuals suffered no (or minimal) direct personal
ramifications from the misbehavior that occurred under their watch
underscores the dysfunctional nature of these Delaware standards.
However, as mentioned above, the decisions remain good law and, in the
case of Caremark specifically, academics and practitioners alike revere the
decisions for their precedential value and longstanding functionality.102
The fact that the directors and officers suffered no personal liability
even at the hands of federal regulators that found the companies culpable
overall may have been reassuring in earlier times. This result reflects the
federal regulatory regime and its priorities during a period when businesses
were extended the benefit of the doubt.103 However, with the advent of
more stringent investigatory and enforcement standards under the
Yates Memo, the oversight obligations under these two cases must evolve
to better prepare companies and their decision makers to act
prophylactically by: (1) designing and implementing effective oversight
policies and procedures; (2) engaging in proactive review of the
investigatory functions; and (3) when problems are discovered, taking
definitive steps to remedy the situation.
While Caremark and Stone achieve the Delaware courts’ goal of
establishing a duty of oversight while simultaneously avoiding excessive
judicial interference with the boardroom decision-making process, the
decisions do not provide adequate direction to compel directors and
officers to actively and authoritatively protect companies from misconduct.
The Caremark duty to oversee legal compliance is not sufficiently specific
to demand active director oversight of investigations. Further, it permits
timid or self-preserving directors to avoid clashes with management that

oversight of compliance activities was materially deficient.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Press Release, supra note 71 (“Caremark agreed to plead guilty to two one-count informations charging
that it defrauded federal health-care programs by making improper payments to induce doctors and
other professionals to refer patients to Caremark.”).
101
See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971–72; Stone, 911 A.2d at 372–73.
102
Sale, supra note 74, at 720–21, 755.
103
See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 773, 793–94 (2004) (noting that a climate supportive of the idea that “businesses-can-dono-wrong” permitted Enron and companies like it to overpower regulatory measures).
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could otherwise prevent costly investigations and legal proceedings in the
future.104
One could argue, anecdotally, that since the advent of these oversight
decisions under Delaware law, we have seen numerous instances of
companies committing culpable actions that might have been stopped
under a more rigorous oversight regime. In 2015, 66% of all Fortune 500
companies were incorporated under Delaware law, a figure that is up from
58% in 2000.105 This represents a significant percentage of American
businesses and, presumably, a number of these entities engaged in illegal
conduct during this time. Additionally, Delaware judges are among the
most renowned experts in business law.106 Therefore, given its unique
insight into complex business law, Delaware should be leading the pack to
shift its policies as the federal government seeks to target individuals at an
unprecedented rate.
The idea that Delaware must strike a balance between having legal
standards that reflect pro-business principles on the one hand, and
providing some means of redress for shareholders after acts of misconduct
on the other, has been called into question in recent years.107 The scandals
of Enron,108 WorldCom,109 Tyco,110 Volkswagen,111 and Wells Fargo112 all
104

Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, and Stone: Directors’ Evolving Duty
to Monitor 4–5 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ., Paper No. 160, 2008), http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/160/
[https://www.perma.cc/7NBW-VAST].
105
JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DEL. DIV. OF CORP., DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS 2015
ANNUAL REPORT (2015), https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2015%20Annual%20Report.pdf
[https://www.perma.cc/E99M-VFXW].
106
Semuels, supra note 44.
107
See id. (noting Delaware has “little desire to change its laws to make them more employeefriendly”); see also Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1590 (2005) (noting that Delaware “cannot effectively
regulate certain types of misconduct”).
108
See WILLIAM C. POWERS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE 22 (2002),
http://i.cnn.net/cnn/2002/LAW/02/02/enron.report/powers.report.pdf
[https://www.perma.cc/B8HUPKRK] (determining the Enron Board of Directors failed in its oversight duties); see also S. REP. NO.
107-70, at 3, 13–14, 23 (2002), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT80393/pdf/CPRT107SPRT80393.pdf [https://www.perma.cc/P2BJ-5JGC] (concluding that the Enron Board of Directors
failed to safeguard Enron shareholders).
109
See DENNIS R. BERESFORD, NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH & C.B. ROGERS, JR., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
WORLDCOM, INC. 30–33 (2003), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/723527/0000931763030
01862/dex991.htm [https://www.perma.cc/2V7C-57VC] (concluding “[t]he Board and its Committees
did not function in a way that made it likely that they would notice red flags”); DICK THORNBURGH,
FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF DICK THORNBURGH, BANKRUPTCY COURT EXAMINER IN RE: WORLDCOM,
INC., ET. AL., (2002), http://news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/worldcom/thornburgh1strpt.pdf [https://www.
perma.cc/YPA8-L5K6] (noting the Audit Committee “did not appear to operate effectively”).
110
See Joann S. Lublin & Jerry Guidera, Tyco’s Board Is Criticized for Kozlowski Dealings,
WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2002), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1023407877377626960
[https://www.perma.cc/9VNS-26N8] (noting experts generally agreed the board was “far too
unquestioning” and lacked sufficient oversight); William C. Symonds, Commentary: Tyco: How Did
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reflect corporate decision-making environments where there was only
minimal oversight. In response to these scandals, the federal government
has acted in kind by attempting to change the rules of the game to facilitate
better regulation and ultimately prevent misbehavior. Congress held
hearings and ultimately passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.113 The Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has adopted new regulations and
guidance since the early 2000s in an ongoing attempt to accelerate
corporate oversight reform.114 Even individual states passed new laws or
sought criminal charges against executives that took part in the scandals.115
All the while, Delaware common law remains largely unchanged.116
The bases of its legal standards have stayed the same over the past two
decades while the federal regulatory standards have experienced an
extensive overhaul.117 This may be a result of the institutional mechanisms
at work in Delaware. The courts’ and legislature’s most powerful
constituents are the businesses that pay handsomely to incorporate within
the state.118 As evidence of the power corporations wield within the state,
Delaware’s Division of Corporations general fund revenue topped
$1 billion in 2015, which accounts for 26% of the State of Delaware’s
They
Miss
a
Scam
So
Big?,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Sept.
29,
2002),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2002-09-29/commentary-tyco-how-did-they-miss-a-scamso-big [https://www.perma.cc/7K8P-N826] (commenting that the scandal would not have occurred had
the board’s oversight been adequate).
111
See James B. Stewart, Problems at Volkswagen Start in the Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 24, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/business/international/problems-atvolkswagen-start-in-the-boardroom.html [https://www.perma.cc/Qm8Q-GJWD] (noting a scandal was
“all but inevitable” due, in part, to its “clannish board”); Patrick Ambrosio, Volkswagen Executives
BNA
(June
19,
2016),
Implicated
in
Diesel-Cheating
Scandal,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bna.com/volkswagen-executives-implicated-b73014445007
[https://www.perma.cc/MR5Y-B5H5] (noting there were “years of illegal activity that dozens of
employees, corporate officers, and senior executives were aware of”).
112
See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Pervasive Sham Deals at Wells Fargo, and No One Noticed?,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/business/dealbook/pervasivesham-deals-at-wells-fargo-and-no-one-noticed.html
[https://www.perma.cc/QK72-MHHA]
(highlighting the disconnect between what the CEO “was telling the public and what was actually
going on”); Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening Accounts,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargofined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html?mcubz=0 [https://www.perma.cc/W4BH-G8L2] (noting the
scandal “reflected serious flaws in the . . . oversight at Wells Fargo”).
113
Kahan & Rock, supra note 107, at 1617.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
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In 2015, Delaware registered 480 companies per day and as of 2016, Delaware was home to
more businesses (around 1.1 million) than residents (around 935,000). David Kocieniewski,
(Apr.
27,
2016)
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Incorporation
Machine,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-27/delaware-s-1-billion-opacity-industry-gives-u-sonshore-haven [https://www.perma.cc/2DXH-37EF].
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general fund revenue. This money comes directly from those companies
that must pay business incorporation costs, taxes, and franchise fees in
order to operate as Delaware companies.120 Further, the court system is
known for addressing controversy only when it is presented with a legal
dispute on point in order to provide continuity.121 However, Delaware
continues to move forward without implementing overarching changes;
instead, it offers methodical, incremental shifts over many years.122
From one perspective, Delaware may need to react soon to the
changing tides or face the prospect of becoming irrelevant in the realm of
director and officer oversight. As these acts of corporate malfeasance
continue, it becomes increasingly likely that the Delaware common law
oversight standards will fall upon deaf ears because they fail to effectuate
adequate protection for the entity and its shareholders.123 The common law
may also be found to represent such a low bar when it comes to business
oversight that it no longer has its intended legal value of establishing
standards of behavior.124
Some commentators argue that Caremark already represents an
irrelevant standard due to the fact that federal regulatory policy already
established new, more rigorous requirements that make Delaware common
law standards a mere afterthought.125 In his article, Mercer Bullard argues
that despite its “iconic status,” Caremark plays only a small role in the
application of corporate compliance programs because rational corporate
actors seek to mitigate the risks that result in the greatest cost.126 From
Bullard’s perspective, rational corporate actors are more likely to analyze
oversight obligation decisions as one would evaluate free-market forces.127
Under this theory, the Delaware courts’ decisions in Caremark and Stone
offer negligible guidance because the ultimate standards by which directors
and officers are judged under federal regulatory law are much more
119
Bullock, supra note 105; see Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 694 (2002) (“Delaware residents derive financial gains from
providing professional services to public corporations incorporated in the state.”)
120
Semuels, supra note 44.
121
Kahan & Rock, supra note 107, at 1617.
122
Id. at 1576. Part of the reason for this slow evolution of Delaware law is its lack of competition
from other state corporate courts. This preeminence is based on a number of “political and economic
factors” including a specialized business court and its “extensive and widely known corporate case
law.” Kahan & Kamar, supra note 119, at 725–26.
123
Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 19 (2013).
124
See id. at 20 (noting administrative guidelines are more motivating than common law liability);
see also Julian J. Z. Polaris, Backstop Ambiguity: A Proposal for Balance Specificity and Ambiguity in
Financial Regulation, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 262–63 (2014) (“Boards have a fiduciary duty to
monitor for illegal conduct, but the monitoring system need only comport with the minimally adequate
standard of the business judgment rule.”).
125
See Bullard, supra note 123, at 19–20.
126
Id. at 16.
127
Id. at 19.
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imposing. While Bullard’s thesis may give some directors and officers
more credit for their decision-making rationales than they deserve, the
ultimate outcome is instructive: a director or officer that conforms his
behavior to anything but the highest applicable standards leaves his
company, and arguably himself, vulnerable to subsequent legal action.
While it remains unclear whether Delaware will ultimately change
course and adapt to the changing regulatory environment, the court’s
prominent reputation stands to suffer if its decisions lack meaningful
application to companies and their decision makers. The outcomes in the
criminal prosecutions for the entities in Caremark and Stone support this
assertion. Thus, it is with this mindset that we must evaluate just how the
federal regulatory environment continues to evolve and incorporate more
stringent standards for seeking personal liability, as it is likely that such
standards are increasingly at odds with those found in Delaware.
II.

CORPORATE CRIMINALITY IN THE CROSSHAIRS

The Yates Memo is the product of a regulatory environment that
increasingly focused on the need for more criminal liability for corporate
officers and executives in the face of scandal.129 During that time, at least
twenty-six Fortune 100 corporations were subject to federal criminal
investigations.130 However, instead of those investigations resulting in
prison sentences for individual directors and officers of the companies,
they largely resulted in the execution of non-prosecution agreements,
deferred-prosecution agreements, or plea agreements.131

128

Id.
See Michael P. Kelly & Ruth E. Mandelbaum, Are the Yates Memorandum and the Federal
Judiciary’s Concerns About Over-Criminalization Destined to Collide?, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV., 899,
901–02 (2016) (noting that the DOJ was heavily criticized for not holding individuals criminally liable
despite securing significant amounts of money through fines and penalties for corporate entity
misbehavior).
130
Id.
131
Id.; see also, e.g., The Yates Memo, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 11, 2015),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-yates-memo/ [https://www.perma.cc/7SBA-2AQT] (stating that
between 2008 and 2014, 75% of corporate enforcement actions stemming from the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act failed to include charges against individual defendants); see also Michael C. Gross,
Carolyn H. Kendall & Aaron S. Mapes, Will Volkswagen Executives Be the Yates Memo’s First
Casualties?, BLOOMBERG BNA, 2 (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.postschell.com/site/files/post__
schell__will_volkswagen_executives_be_the_yates_memos_first_casualties__bloomberg_bna__dec_1
5.pdf [https://www.perma.cc/FM7U-QKZF] (citing the Deferred Prosecution Agreements for
JPMorgan Chase Bank from January 6, 2015, and General Motors Co. from September 17, 2015, as
examples demonstrating that the government “has pursued only the company and resolved the case
through a non- or deferred prosecution agreement imposing substantial corporate financial penalties but
no jail time for executives”).
129
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For the DOJ, agreeing to alternative forms of punishment allowed it to
collect extensive fines and effectuate other headline-grabbing penalties,132
but it failed in its overarching goal to secure more criminal liability in a
crusade that has stretched the administrations of multiple presidents and
numerous Attorneys General.133 The Yates Memo stands to change this
dynamic by emphasizing individual liability without reducing the attention
afforded to prosecutions of culpable entities.134 As such, the Yates Memo
signals a shift from the more entity-centric prosecutions of the past to
incorporate a more individual-focused model moving forward.135 In order
to best analyze this movement, the Yates Memo must be reviewed against
its predecessors to determine if the DOJ is indeed signaling a pending
ground shift in policy to which corporations nationwide should react.
A. Federal Targeting of Corporate Wrongdoing
The custom of composing DOJ memos by sitting Deputy Attorneys
General appears to have started with then-Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder in 1999.136 Since then, many—but not all—Deputy Attorneys
General have used the eponymous memo-writing process to announce
132
See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Collects
More than $15.3 Billion in Civil and Criminal Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-collects-more-153-billion-civil-and-criminal-casesfiscal-year-2016 [https://www.perma.cc/SJR6-WV2X] (noting that the DOJ’s collections in FY 2016
ending on September 30, 2016, totaled $15.3 billion and “represent[] more than five times the
approximately $3 billion appropriated budget” for the department generally); Press Release, Office of
Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Collects More than $23 Billion in Civil and
Criminal Cases in Fiscal Year 2015 (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentcollects-more-23-billion-civil-and-criminal-cases-fiscal-year-2015 [https://www.perma.cc/U3R4-8SZJ]
(noting that the DOJ’s collections in FY 2015 ending on September 30, 2015, totaled $23 billion,
including an $8.2 billion settlement in August with Bank of America for its actions leading up to the
2008 financial crisis).
133
See, e.g., Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads
of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 28, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf
[https:/www.perma.cc/YA64JRKX] (noting that the DOJ policy to hold individuals accountable for corporate misconduct has been
in place for many years). The Filip Memo, released in 2008, noted: “Where a decision is made to
charge a corporation, it does not necessarily follow that individual directors, officers, employees, or
shareholders should not also be charged. Prosecution of a corporation is not a substitute for the
prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or without the corporation.” Id.
134
Yates, supra note 1.
135
See id. at 4 (“[B]y focusing on individuals from the very beginning of an investigation, we
maximize the chances that the final resolution of an investigation uncovering the misconduct will
include civil or criminal charges against not just the corporation but against culpable individuals as
well.”); Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1794 (2015)
(citing a new DOJ memorandum “amending its guidelines to reflect a focus on individual
accountability for corporate crimes”).
136
Jim Letten & Carol Montgomery, The Yates Memo: What New Challenges to Expect, LAW 360
(Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/738741/the-yates-memo-what-new-challenges-toexpect [https://www.perma.cc/XP85-HHLM].
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general policies and identify any long-term goals. All the while, the
political environment in Washington, D.C., continues to change, making it
difficult to determine if the priorities under one administration will carry
on to the next. Along those lines, despite a fear by some that the Trump
Administration might not take prosecution of individual corporate
wrongdoers seriously,138 Attorney General Jeff Sessions vowed in April
2016 that “[t]he Department of Justice will continue to emphasize the
importance of holding individuals accountable for corporate misconduct.
It is not merely companies, but specific individuals, who break the law. We
will work closely with our law enforcement partners, both here and abroad,
to bring these persons to justice.”139 Therefore, despite the inevitable
degree of uncertainty regarding how vigorously the current or any
subsequent administration might adhere to long-term policy commitments
embodied in prior DOJ memos, a brief review of those DOJ memos over
the past twenty years uncovers some key principles that animate prevailing
prosecutorial practices.
1. The Holder Memo (1999)
The Holder Memo stemmed from the efforts of a working group
coordinated by the DOJ that also included representatives from the

137

See, e.g., Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All
U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
[https://www.perma.cc/S6UR-K5V4] (offering guidance regarding marijuana enforcement);
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Selected U.S. Att’ys
(Oct.
19,
2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medicalmarijuana.pdf [https://www.perma.cc/BY2L-ADUZ] (announcing formal guidelines for federal
prosecutors in states that authorize the medical use of marijuana); Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty,
Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys (Dec. 12,
2006),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/05/mcnulty_memo.pdf
[https://www.perma.cc/7SYX-YJYL] (offering guidance on DOJ policy regarding the prosecution of
business organizations). The foregoing examples demonstrate that numerous former Deputy Attorneys
General have issued memorandums to announce new Department of Justice policies.
138
See, e.g., Bethany McLean, Why White-Collar Crooks May Be Cheering This Jeff Sessions
Memo, YAHOO FINANCE (Mar. 21, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-white-collar-crooksmay-be-cheering-this-jeff-sessions-memo-133115487.html
[https://www.perma.cc/57QX-628S]
(noting that Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s March 8 memo “directs prosecutors to focus not on
corporate crime, but on violent crime”).
139
Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance Initiative
Annual Conference (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessionsdelivers-remarks-ethics-and-compliance-initiative-annual [https://www.perma.cc/HQL2-CYLT]; see
also Matt Zapotosky, Sessions: Focus on Violent Crime Doesn’t Mean Lax Enforcement for WhiteCollar Offenses, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/sessions-focus-on-violent-crime-doesnt-mean-lax-enforcement-for-white-collaroffenses/2017/04/24/d36d4034-2906-11e7-be51-b3fc6ff7faee_story.html?nid&utm_term=.510697
7a04a5/ [https://www.perma.cc/PE4Z-F8EZ] (“Attorney General Jeff Sessions vowed Monday not to
diminish the Justice Department’s focus on corporate fraud, asserting that a vigorous interest in violent
crime would not diminish its long-standing mission to prosecute white-collar offenders.”).
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USAO. While the Holder Memo was the DOJ’s first statement on how
to create uniform guidelines on corporate prosecution,141 it received little
fanfare initially because the United States was thriving economically and
prosecuting corporations was not “en vogue.”142 Nevertheless, Holder
drafted the Holder Memo in response to complaints about the lack of a
uniform approach to charging corporations for their misbehavior.143
The Holder Memo included eight factors to guide prosecutors’ analysis
of whether to bring charges against a corporation in a particular case.144
As such, the memo and the factors therein were not compulsory.145 The
memo highlighted the deterrence value of bringing suit against
corporations and the idea that setting an example will ultimately lead to a
change in the culture of indicted corporations and their employees.146
The primary focus of the memo was to provide guidance on the
prosecution of corporations, and importantly, it included a reminder in
Section I, subsection (B) that “[c]harging a corporation, however, does not
mean that individual directors, officers, employees, or shareholders should
not also be charged.”147 The memo went on to note that corporations alone
do not engage in criminal conduct and are only culpable for acts of natural
persons.148 Therefore, the acts of management personnel of culpable
corporations should be analyzed, but very little guidance was offered in
determining if individuals should be formally prosecuted.149
It is also important to note that the Holder Memo intended to direct
line prosecutors to follow specific guidance on how to prioritize DOJ
policies and determine when to be lenient with corporations under
140

Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t
Components and U.S. Att’ys 1 (June 16, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF [https://www.perma.cc/SN27-46X8] (noting that the ad
hoc working group included USAO members, the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, and Divisions
within the Department with criminal law enforcement responsibilities).
141
Cindy A. Schipani, The Future of the Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate Criminal
Investigations, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921, 945 n.167 (2009) (citing Lawrence D. Finder, Internal
Investigations: Consequences of the Federal Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111,
113–14 (2003)).
142
Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1449 (2007).
143
Nicole T. Amsler, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying Federal Corporate Charging
Considerations to Individuals, 66 DUKE L.J. 169, 190 n.133 (2016) (citing Peter Lattman, The Holder
Memo and Its Progeny, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/13/the-holdermemo/ [https://www.perma.cc/KFB9-2YM7]).
144
Holder, supra note 140, at 3.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 2.
147
See id. at 2–3 (stating that prosecutors should evaluate the “pervasiveness of wrongdoing
within the corporation, including the complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate
management”).
148
Id. at 4.
149
Id.
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investigation. While the eight factors informed prosecutors’ decisions of
whether to bring charges,151 they also suggested that corporate prosecutions
could be deferred if the corporation took appropriate steps to prevent the
wrongdoing.152 Specifically, the factors focused on the “pervasiveness of
the wrongdoing” within the organization,153 the corporation’s “timely and
voluntary disclosure” of wrongdoing and cooperation in the
investigation,154 “the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s
compliance program,”155 and the corporation’s attempts to remedy the
situation by creating or improving its compliance program or addressing
personnel issues.156 Together, these factors largely focused on the ability of
a corporation to limit its own criminal liability and, at least contextually, it
appeared that the criminal prosecution of individual actors was a
second-tier priority.
2. The Thompson Memo (2003)
Shortly after the release of the Holder Memo, the economic prosperity
enjoyed throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s gave way to a series of
serious public accounting scandals involving economic powers such as
Enron and WorldCom.157 These scandals and others that came to light
during this period made it evident that further reforms were needed in the
area of corporate prosecutions.158 Specifically, the DOJ sought to address a
pervasive corporate culture determined to make profits at all costs.159
Based on these concerns, sitting Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson
composed the Thompson Memo by amending the Holder Memo’s initial
directives.160

150
See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 968 n.122,
969 (2009) (citing Michael Siegel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle over Waiver of the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2009) (“Prior to 1998, DOJ had no set policy
regarding the prosecution of corporations . . . .”)).
151
Holder, supra note 140, at 3.
152
See id. at 3 (stating that what the company is doing to correct its behaviors should be taken
under consideration when deciding how to proceed with a corporate target); see also Baer, supra note
150, at 968–69.
153
Holder, supra note 140, at 3.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Paulsen, supra note 142, at 1449–50.
158
See id. at 1450 (stating that after a series of corporate crimes were committed, the DOJ
reprioritized how it dealt with corporate crimes).
159
Id.
160
Beth A. Wilkinson & Alex Young K. Oh, The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations: A Ten-Year Anniversary Perspective, 27 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N INSIDE 8; see Amsler,
supra note 143 (stating that the Thompson Memo was published in 2003 as part of a renewed effort by
the Department of Justice).
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The Thompson Memo emphasized the concept of corporate
cooperation during the investigatory process.161 Specifically, the memo
sought to increase the quality and authenticity of a corporation’s
cooperation when the federal government investigated it for
wrongdoing.162 At issue was the fact that many corporations cooperated
facially with investigations while behind the scenes they were intentionally
impeding investigations altogether.163 The memo stated that corporations
that do offer timely, voluntary, and truthful disclosures should benefit in
order to encourage adherence to the policy.164
Additionally, the Thompson Memo escalated the Holder Memo’s eight
factors from optional guidelines165 to binding requirements.166 The
Thompson Memo also added a ninth factor to be considered: “the
adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the
corporation’s malfeasance.”167 This ninth factor indicated that the DOJ
intended to include the severity of punishment incurred by individuals in
the consideration of the entity’s culpability and vice versa. Boosting the
emphasis on individual liability, the memo also stated that only in rare
situations would individuals not be pursued, even if a corporation offered
to plead guilty.168
The Thompson Memo represented a significant shift because it
coincided with both a simultaneous rise in the number of prosecutions of
the United States’ largest public companies and an ever-more hostile

161
Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of
Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys 1 (Jan. 20, 2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://www.perma.cc/G6F2-VJJU].
162
Id.
163
See id. at 6–8 (providing examples such as broad assertions, directions to employees to not
cooperate, and incomplete production of records).
164
See id. at 3, 6–8 (stating that in some instances, immunity or amnesty is considered when a
corporation voluntarily discloses information).
165
See Holder, supra note 140, at 1 (“Federal prosecutors are not required to reference these
factors in a particular case, nor are they required to document the weight they accorded specific factors
in reaching their decision.”).
166
See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 541 F.3d 130
(2d Cir. 2008) (“Unlike its predecessor, however, the Thompson Memorandum is binding on all federal
prosecutors.”); id. at 338 n.12 (“The Thompson Memorandum sets forth nine factors that federal
prosecutors must consider in determining whether to charge a corporation or other business
organization.” (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 163 (2005)));
see also John Power, Show Me the Money: The Thompson Memo, Stein, and an Employee’s Right to
the Advancement of Legal Fees Under the McNulty Memo, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1205, 1217 (2007)
(“Unlike the Holder Memo, intended only to provide guidance, the Thompson Memo was binding on
all federal prosecutors.”).
167
Thompson, supra note 161, at 3.
168
See id. at 1 (“Only rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued, even in the
face of offers of corporate guilty pleas.”).
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regulatory environment.
The DOJ incorporated the nine factors
identified in the memo in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual in response to
“concerns regarding attorney-client privilege and corporate payment of
attorney’s fees.”170 The Thompson Memo’s drafting process also reflected
a more holistic effort politically. Less than six months before the release of
the Thompson Memo, President George W. Bush established his Corporate
Fraud Task Force “in order to strengthen the efforts of the Department of
Justice and . . . to investigate and prosecute significant financial
crimes . . . .”171 President Bush’s Corporate Fraud Task Force worked
closely with the DOJ and the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee to
draft the Thompson Memo.172
With this growing momentum, prosecutors interpreted the memo as an
implied grant of power to reach further than they had previously in order to
secure cooperation.173
This emphasis on cooperation manifested itself under the application
of the fourth factor due to its relation to the waiver of attorney-client
privilege and work product protection.174 The Thompson Memo noted that
frequently “business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a
Department investigation, in fact take steps to impede the quick and effect
exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing under investigation.”175
To combat these issues, the memo listed four sub-factors under the fourth
factor on cooperation, including the corporation’s willingness to:
(1) “identify the culprits within the corporation”; (2) “make witnesses
available”; (3) “disclose complete results of its internal investigation”; and
(4) “waive attorney-client privilege and work product protection.”176
These sub-factors were the source of significant criticism, especially
given their implications on “the rights, privileges, and interests of the
corporation and those of its employees.”177 Ultimately, the Thompson
Memo faced immense backlash from a variety of sources alleging that the
169

See Brandon L. Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecutions,
101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60, 63 (2016) (noting that the guidelines for corporations shifted from a more
lenient structure under the Leniency Program to a strict structure under the Thompson Memo).
170
Id. at 63–64.
171
Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 11, 2002).
172
See Thompson, supra note 161 (stating that the DOJ worked in conjunction with the Corporate
Fraud Task Force and the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee to create the memorandum).
173
See Baer, supra note 150, at 969–70 (“The Thompson Memorandum’s ostensible guidance to
prosecutors was understood as the government’s attempt to flex its muscle and force corporations to
hand over otherwise protected documents . . . .”); Schipani, supra note 141, at 948 (“[T]he Thompson
Memorandum shifts the prosecutor’s focus further to the evaluation of cooperation.”).
174
Thompson, supra note 161, at 3 (“[T]he corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary,
the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product protection . . . .”).
175
Id. at i.
176
Id. at 6.
177
Schipani, supra note 141, at 949.

416

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:2

DOJ was abusing its power by compromising protected legal rights. 178
The American Civil Liberties Union, American Bar Association, National
Association of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
combined to lobby against the measures.179 Senator Arlen Spector
introduced new legislation that would amend the DOJ’s policy under the
Thompson Memo.180 Due to the pressure, the DOJ finally released a new
memo in 2006.181
3. The McNulty Memo (2006)182
Paul McNulty, the Deputy Attorney General from 2005 to 2006,183
announced a policy shift in the way that the attorney-client privilege
waiver was handled by the DOJ and the USAO under the Thompson
Memo.184 The McNulty Memo followed significant criticism of the
Thompson Memo’s provisions pertaining to attorney-client privilege and
the potential impact that waiver had during regulatory investigations.185
After a coalition of business and legal organizations expressed concerns
about the provisions in the Thompson Memo,186 the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary held hearings to enact the Attorney-Client Privilege Act of
2006.187
Then, on December 12, 2006, the DOJ released the McNulty Memo,
incorporating the key aspects of the policy announced in the
Attorney-Client Privilege Act.188 The McNulty Memo stated that federal
prosecutors seeking privileged attorney-client communications or legal
178

Paulsen, supra note 142, at 1435.
Id. at 1435 n.5 (citing Jason McLure, Coalition Scores Major Victory in Policy Retreat: How
Business, Civil Liberties Groups Pushed DOJ to Alter Fraud Stance, LEGAL TIMES (Dec. 18, 2006),
http://advance.lexis.com/ (search in search bar: “LNSDUID-ALM-LGLTME-LT_2006_12_
14609350324372541469”)).
180
Id. (citing Lynnley Browning, Senator Calls for an Easing of Corporate-Wrongdoing Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2006, at C3 (noting that the proposed bill would amend the “nine factors that
prosecutors must consider when weighing whether to indict” and “is the latest challenge to the tactics,
which have come under scrutiny from trade groups, former United States attorneys general and a
prominent federal judge”)).
181
See N. Richard Janis, The McNulty Memorandum: Much Ado About Nothing, WASH. LAW.,
Feb. 2007, at 37 (“As a result of these pressures . . . the Department of Justice, with great fanfare, on
December 12, 2006, replaced the Thompson Memorandum . . . .”).
182
See Letten & Montgomery, supra note 136 (noting that the Thompson Memo “for the most
part remained in effect” through Deputy Attorney General James (Jim) B. Comey’s tenure from 2003–
05).
183
Id.
184
See McNulty, supra note 137, at 8 n.2 (“The reference to consideration of a corporation’s
waiver of attorney-client . . . protections in reducing a corporation’s culpability score . . . was deleted
effective November 1, 2006.”).
185
Janis, supra note 181, at 35.
186
McLure, supra note 179.
187
Janis, supra note 181, at 37.
188
Id. at 37, 39.
179
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advice given to a company had to first secure written approval from the
Deputy Attorney General.189 Also, the McNulty Memo included direction
that emphasized the DOJ’s consideration of a corporation’s meaningful
compliance programs.190 These provisions were directly related to the
perception that the Thompson Memo had gone too far in its policies
relating to the waiver of attorney-client privilege, and demonstrated the
power of industry maintaining a watchful eye on the DOJ moving
forward.191
However, even under the McNulty Memo’s new terms, prosecutors
and corporations continued to battle over attorney-client privilege
problems that doomed the Thompson Memo.192 The clamor for change
eventually led the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security to hold hearings in 2007 to determine
whether the McNulty Memo’s guidance did enough to resolve the concerns
stemming from the Thompson Memo.193 When Congress threatened new
legislation addressing the lingering concerns in the McNulty Memo, the
DOJ reacted with yet another revision.194
4. The Filip Memo (2008)
The most recent memo, preceding the Yates memo, comes from
Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip, who served from 2008 to 2009.195
The Filip Memo’s most important revision focused once again on
cooperation credit and whether credit is dependent upon a waiver of
attorney-client privilege.196 The memo stated that waiver of privilege was
not, and had never been, a prerequisite to the subject of an investigation
being viewed as cooperative.197 The memo went on to state that a
prosecutor should never ask a corporation to waive its protections under
attorney-client privilege.198 Rather, the memo clarified that the emphasis
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should be on whether the corporation provided investigators with all
relevant facts.199
In addition to announcing that attorney-client privilege was not a
consideration in determining whether to charge an entity, the Filip Memo
stated that a company’s determination that it would pay its employees’
legal fees was also not a consideration for cooperation credit.200 The Filip
Memo’s changes marked a significant winnowing down of the
considerations available to prosecutors when determining whether to
charge companies for misconduct. However, cooperation credit remained
an extremely important tool for companies under investigation to
potentially limit liability.201 As the legality of prior policies came under
fire, the DOJ was forced to react in kind. Thus, by the time the Filip Memo
was released, the “cooperation” in cooperation credit consisted of the
disclosure of all relevant factual information to the investigation, but it did
not include the waiver of any privileges.202
B. The Yates Memo
The directives in the memos leading up to the Yates Memo share a
number of collective principles, but they largely reflect a slow, methodical
shift toward securing increased individual accountability for wrongdoing.
This is to be expected given that the memos typically revise or build upon,
instead of wholly replace, their predecessors’ policies.203 Therefore, the
announcement of the Yates Memo was especially significant because it
foreshadows another significant ground shift specifically targeting
criminally culpable corporate actors.204
When the DOJ issued the Yates Memo on September 9, 2015,205 it
represented the fifth such memo in fifteen years to address the prosecution
of wrongdoing by corporate entities and individuals.206 The Yates Memo is
199
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broken up into six directives that have already been incorporated into the
U.S. Attorney’s Manual.207 The Yates Memo states that it will apply to
both criminal and civil corporate investigations that occur both in the
future and those pending as of the date of the Yates Memo’s release.208
This section will first describe each of the directives in greater detail.
In order to determine the viability of the Yates Memo’s effectiveness, a
brief discussion of the initial commentary will follow. The section will
culminate with a discussion of how the Yates Memo interacts with the
current standards used to govern federal oversight investigations.
1. Cooperation Credit
The Yates Memo’s most striking policy change pertains to the
extension of cooperation credit for companies that are under
investigation.209 The policy states that in order “[t]o be eligible for any
cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the Department [of
Justice] all relevant facts about the individuals involved in corporate
misconduct.”210 Cooperation credit is used by the DOJ and other regulatory
bodies to lower the liability for corporations that provide timely and
thorough disclosures of all facts pertaining to the matter at issue. 211
This disclosure requirement also pertains to facts about culpable
individuals from the outset.212
If the directive is strictly interpreted, it will require companies seeking
cooperation credit to not only disclose what they know about the actions
taken to date, but also to engage in the process of learning the facts
necessary to meet the DOJ’s needs.213 Only then, once the company has
met this new threshold test, can the company even be considered eligible to
receive cooperation credit according to the “other traditionally applied
factors.”214 This policy represents a sharp change from memos in the past.
As Deputy Attorney General Yates stated:
In the past, cooperation credit was a sliding scale of sorts and
companies could still receive at least some credit . . . even if
they failed to fully disclose all facts about individuals. That’s
207
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changed now. . . . [P]roviding complete information about
individuals’ involvement in wrongdoing is a threshold hurdle
that must be crossed before we’ll consider any cooperation
credit.215
Commentators have labeled this an “all-or-nothing” proposition216 that
assumes that companies are currently withholding significant information
from investigators.217 While the validity of this concern might vary on a
case-by-case basis, a company faces the difficult task of proceeding
without cooperation credit that was once a key mitigation benefit used by
corporations for leverage in negotiating less severe penalties. Also, the
policy significantly increases the burden for corporations to find
information about culpable individuals.218 Rather than settling with a
company’s stated failure to find culpable individuals, the new guidance
basically requires the company to bring forth an individual or group of
individuals, or disclose all of the information used to determine that no
culpable individual was involved. This disclosure may include information
that is or is not privileged,219 reintroducing problems of the not-so-distant
past.
There are numerous implications for companies under the new
application of the cooperation policy. First, engaging in potential “life or
death” investigations may require incredible expense and longer periods of
investigation.220 This could be detrimental to normal business operations,
which ultimately hurts not just the company but also its shareholders.
Second, because of its all-or-nothing structure, companies can no longer
receive partial credit for partial disclosure.221 Therefore, some companies
may determine that engaging in the process as defined under the Yates
Memo is too costly and decide to go silent or not fully engage in the
process.222 This would require the DOJ to conduct a full investigation with
little chance of receiving internal assistance without compromising its goal
215
Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at American Banking
Association and American Bar Association Money Laundering Enforcement Conference
(Nov. 16, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yatesdelivers-remarks-american-banking-0 [https://www.perma.cc/32QH-AF88].
216
Ryan Hedges & Kirsten Konar, Yates Memo Creates a Privilege Paradox for GCs, LAW360
(Feb. 5, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/755157/yates-memo-creates-a-privilegeparadox-for-gcs [https://www.perma.cc/EGG4-2K3Y]; Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 129, at 906.
217
Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 129, at 907.
218
Id. at 909.
219
G. Douglas Jones & Christopher J. Nicholson, The Rules Have Just Changed: DOJ Issues New
Guidance Targeting Individuals in Corporation Investigations, 77 ALA. LAW. 264, 268 (2016).
220
See Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 129, at 909–10 (noting that the increasing emphasis on
internal investigations will result in companies being compelled to offer separate attorneys at an earlier
stage, increasing expenses and slowing down the overall investigatory process).
221
Jones & Nicholson, supra note 219, at 267.
222
Kelly & Mandelbaum, supra note 129, at 910.

2018]

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND CRIMINALITY

421

of prosecuting all culpable parties. If this strategy is initially successful in
stifling regulatory action, it could also become the norm, which would
defeat the policy’s overall goal. Third, the process of engaging in an
internal investigation that employees know is intended to identify and
isolate culpable individuals will likely encounter resistance.223 Employees
will be less inclined to cooperate with management without hiring their
own personal counsel, and lower level employees that cannot afford to do
so may determine that it is in their best interest to not participate at all.
Despite these potential concerns, the cooperation credit policy delivers
an undeniably strong message that the DOJ wants to increase personal
liability at all costs. For those officers and directors tasked with designing
and implementing oversight programs, the cooperation credit policy
provides an added incentive to design a program that can quickly and
definitively identify culpable individuals. Once a DOJ investigation is
underway, this will permit the board and management to react swiftly and
present investigators with the information needed to benefit from the
cooperation policy. However, if these systems of oversight are not yet in
place, the prospect of going without cooperation credit becomes much
more likely as the DOJ will no longer accept marginal or incomplete
information.
2. Individual Culpability
The second directive also speaks directly to the DOJ’s desire to
increase individual liability. The policy states that both “criminal and civil
corporate investigations should focus on individuals from the inception of
the investigation.”224 While early directives like the Holder Memo or the
Thompson Memo merely alluded to personal liability as an ancillary part
of a DOJ investigation, this policy reflects the idea that if individuals are
targeted at the outset, it is more likely that they will be held culpable at the
end when charges are filed.225
The Yates Memo identifies three goals in relation to the policy. 226
First, the policy seeks to maximize the discovery of corporate wrongdoing,
because the corporation itself can only act through individuals.227 Second,
the policy increases the likelihood that individuals with knowledge of the
facts at issue will cooperate and provide information on other culpable
individuals further up the managerial hierarchy.228 This goal is especially
important in the context of corporate oversight as lower-tier employees
223
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may be more inclined to provide incriminating information against those
that hold positions of power. Third, the policy increases the chance that the
ultimate resolution of the investigation will result in criminal and/or civil
charges being filed not only against the company, but also against culpable
individuals.229
From the perspective of company employees, this policy presents
challenges because investigators must be dissuaded of their initial
conceptions of events rather than being led naturally to make reasonable
assessments from facts as they are discovered. If an actor is identified at
the outset of an investigation as being potentially culpable, that individual
must either convince investigators that he or she is not involved in the
misconduct, or in the alternative, provide information that would inculpate
another. Again, this dynamic has the potential to dramatically shift the
internal relations of a company and might make it costlier to defend.
3. Investigator Communication
The third policy prioritizes the need for the DOJ to maximize the
efficacy of its resources by demanding that “[c]riminal and civil attorneys
handling corporate investigations . . . be in routine communication with
one another.”230 This policy is by no means revolutionary, but its inclusion
in the Yates Memo reflects the idea that the DOJ seeks to formalize its
investigatory and prosecutorial processes in order to effectuate the best
results. It also signals that the DOJ is preparing for an increased workload
and wants to make sure that its policies and procedures foster efficiency
and communication.
Practically speaking, the policy will require attorneys at the beginning
of a respective case to contact the “other side of the house” about the
investigation.231 While this may present potential issues regarding the
permissible disclosures stemming from the civil side to the criminal side,
and vice versa, the goal is to exchange as much information as possible
under the direction of the law.232
4. Individual Immunity
The fourth policy states that “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, no
corporate resolution will provide protection from criminal or civil liability
for any individuals.”233 While the actual application of the other policies
may result in more anxiety for directors and officers, this policy is
extremely concerning for corporate personnel on its face. Under the
229
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directive, the government will not enter into any agreement with a
company where immunity is offered or other charges are dismissed for
potentially culpable individuals unless there are “extraordinary
circumstances.”234 Although it is unclear what extraordinary circumstances
might be in practice, the fact that these exculpatory “deals” are only
available now in special cases is concerning for directors and officers. As
evidence of the procedural hurdles that must be cleared to offer such
benefits, the prosecutor must secure personal approval in writing from the
relevant supervising Assistant Attorney General or U.S. Attorney on the
case in order to grant immunity.235 This is a high threshold that indicates
that immunity will no longer be granted without sufficient justification that
furthers the DOJ’s overarching goals.
5. Exculpatory Limitations
The fifth policy outlined by the Yates Memo relates strongly to the
fourth policy and requires corporate cases to “not be resolved without a
clear plan to resolve individual cases before the statute of limitations
expires and declinations as to individuals in such cases must be
memorialized.”236 This policy basically removes any excuse the DOJ might
have for missing out on an opportunity to prosecute an otherwise culpable
individual.237
Specifically, the policy requires that when a company resolves its
offenses at a time before the resolution of all related individual
investigations or prosecutions, the DOJ attorney must include a number of
key facts in the prosecution or corporate authorization memorandum.238
First, the attorney must include a discussion of any potentially liable
individuals.239 Second, the attorney must include a description of the
current status of the investigation of individuals and any ongoing work that
is still not complete.240 Third, the attorney must include a plan to bring the
investigation to a close within the applicable statute of limitations
period.241 This largely procedural policy indicates that the DOJ will not
permit cases of potentially culpable individuals to go stale and result in a
missed opportunity. This represents a strong rhetorical device that
motivates DOJ personnel to maintain a close eye on drawn-out
investigations and also indicates to potentially culpable individuals that
they are unlikely to sneak by on a technicality.
234
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6. Irrelevance of Ability to Pay
The final policy directs DOJ civil attorneys to no longer consider a
potentially culpable individual’s ability to pay a fine when deciding
whether to bring suit. Instead, the attorneys should give equal weight to the
deterrent value of the proposed civil action, the value of a winning
recovery at trial, and the ability for a civil penalty to take away any benefit
the suspect has garnered via his misconduct to ensure that the individual
cannot profit from his wrongdoing.242 The Yates Memo also looks at the
practical effects that engaging in a civil suit might have on individuals.243
The benefit that is achieved in deterring similar behavior and also
disclosing to the public that its resources are being protected is important
to changing the current perceptions about corporate legal action.
When considered together, the Yates Memo’s six policies carry a
strong and frightening message to all levels of company actors: the rules
have changed. However, the real implications of the Yates Memo have yet
to be seen. The best indication of the Yates Memo’s efficacy at this time is
garnered through a review of commentators’ projections and how
companies are interpreting the policies.
C. Applying Yates: More Bark than Bite?
The Yates Memo’s release resulted in responses from the legal
community that ran the gamut from the perspective that the policies are
nothing new and will have no impact to extreme concern that the corporate
liability structure as we know it is about to fall to pieces. 244
A significant number of commentators expressed their belief that the
Yates Memo will do what it sets out to do—at least to varying degrees.
The commentators on this side of the debate are far more cautious about
the extent to which the Yates Memo will work given that it was just
recently released. They also defer to the need for patience, as the Yates
Memo will take time to enact and produce identifiable results.245
242
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The Yates Memo’s primary goal is to signal a change in policy where
individual liability is a strong priority.246 Also, because of the Yates
Memo’s explicit terms, the expectations for companies conducting internal
investigations have never been clearer.247 Whereas other prosecutorial
directives have included similarly—or even the same—strong language,
the simultaneous public relations campaign that followed the Yates
Memo’s release supports the idea that the DOJ means business.248 Further,
the consequences for failing to meet those expectations are also explicitly
clear,249 leaving directors and officers to seek out additional information
from counsel about the Yates Memo’s implications.
As such, a number of commentators included their ideas on what
companies should prepare for.250 The primary message advises directors
and officers to plan for the very real possibility that they will face
individual liability.251 This message has two applications. First, directors
and officers should review the company’s compliance and oversight
programs.252 Being able to exercise oversight with or without significant
warnings will provide additional protection by showing that the board and
management were fully engaged. In addition, the oversight and compliance
programs should be able to quickly react to the needs of the company
under an internal investigation based on the higher standards announced in
the Yates Memo.253 Second, directors and officers should review their
liability packages to understand the increased risks under the Yates
Memo’s policies.254 Specifically, attention should be given to determining
whether penalties and fines are covered if assessed by the regulatory
agency, and how prosecutions involving multiple defendants under the
same plan affect an individual’s coverage.255
While the preparations outlined above imply that commentators
believe that the Yates Memo will have an impact on business oversight, it
is unclear when this will occur. The reaction throughout the legal
246
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community seems to imply that the Yates Memo has already had a modest
impact based on the preparatory actions taken by many companies, but it
will be some time before we can conduct any empirical analysis. For
companies and their directors and officers, the prospect of falling behind
may be too risky to wait and see how the Yates Memo’s policies are
interpreted. Therefore, engaging in preemptive reviews of company
oversight and compliance policies, as well as the director and officer
protections, are prudent measures.
On the other hand, the primary concerns from commentators that
believe the Yates Memo will be ineffective start with the idea that its
primary goal is nothing new.256 This perspective relies on the fact that
many of the memos from prior Deputy Attorneys General had similar
aspirations of increasing individual liability.257 However, none of these
memos contain the same degree of explicit language that escalates personal
liability to the same priority level as attaining liability for companies. The
Yates Memo states in no uncertain terms that individual liability is equally
as important as company liability. It then goes on to reinforce this premise
with six concise policies that directly speak to that goal.
Other commentators believe the Yates Memo will be ineffective
because of its practical impediments.258 The policies under prior memos
also encouraged company cooperation, and while the new policies under
the Yates Memo add requirements, the situation remains the same: the DOJ
can only make a case based on the information made available to it.259
Again, while this critique is warranted, the added pressure for companies
to open up to the investigators or suffer the consequences results in a
high-stakes gamble. This pressure is also extended to individuals more
directly under the new policies and may drive increased disclosures.
Another practical complication raised by more skeptical commentators
as well as those that believe the policies will work is the potential that the
Yates Memo’s directives will consume too many DOJ resources to remain
sustainable.260 Again, only time will tell the validity of this concern. If the
DOJ’s directives are interpreted to require prosecutions in each and every
situation where culpable individuals are found, the requisite manpower will
256

See Joseph W. Yockey, Beyond Yates: From Engagement to Accountability in Corporate
Crime, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 407, 411 (2016) (“[T]he memo represents little more than a written
statement of how the game has always been played.”); Kirby Behre et al., A Review of Government
(Apr.
21,
2016,
5:54
PM),
Cases
Against
Execs
in
Q1,
LAW360
https://www.law360.com/articles/787663/a-review-of-gov-t-cases-against-execs-in-q1
[https:www.perma.cc/AWF3-KGJ2] (noting that “critics continue to label the Yates memo a potentially
meaningless prosecutorial policy that is nothing more than an ‘empty threat’”).
257
Yockey, supra note 256, at 411.
258
Id. at 413.
259
Id. at 412–13.
260
Jones & Nicholson, supra note 219, at 272.

2018]

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND CRIMINALITY

427

be immense. However, it should also be noted that the policies under the
Yates Memo require investigations to be carried out largely by the
companies themselves. Assuming that this is an effective and trustworthy
process, the obligations of the DOJ during an investigation may lessen and
allow DOJ personnel to engage in the pursuit of other directives.
The reception of the Yates Memo upon its announcement reflects the
impact that new policies can have on the market. While some have
dismissed the Yates Memo as more of the same old policy seen in other
DOJ memos, others have reacted strongly by advising companies to review
their internal policies in preparation for potential problems. For Delaware,
the prospect of waiting until the companies incorporated within the state
are being subjected to personal criminal liability could be a significant risk.
With its prominent position in the field of corporate law and its heavy
reliance on the revenues it receives as the business law leader,261 Delaware
would be best suited to look closely at the Yates Memo and incorporate the
necessary changes to its oversight standards to best protect against
individual culpability.
III.

DIRECTORIAL DUTIES REDIRECTED

In what way, if any, should Delaware common law react to the Yates
Memo’s stringent prosecutorial posture towards corporate criminality?
Some already suggest a significant retooling of Delaware’s existing
fiduciary duty framework is necessary because Caremark and Stone
provide precious little guidance regarding the necessary steps directors and
officers must take to exercise sufficient oversight.262 Under the existing
common law approach, “[i]n theory, directors face potential liability for
failed oversight. But in practice it is viewed as an unworkable and virtually
meaningless standard where liability exists only within a very narrow
procedural footing.”263 As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in
Caremark, a claim based on failed oversight is “possibly the most difficult
theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a
judgment.”264 Indeed, Delaware courts continue to place strict limits on
establishing oversight liability that effectively immunize directors from
responsibility except when “directors knowingly and completely fail”265 to
act in light of obvious corporate misconduct.
261

Bullock, supra note 105.
Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Delaware
Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 209, 217 (2011); Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight
Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433, 473 (2011); Nees, supra
note 26, at 204–05.
263
Nees, supra note 26, at 205.
264
In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
265
Petrin, supra note 262, at 456.
262

428

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:2

The shortcomings under the rather lax Delaware common law
approach to oversight become especially pronounced in light of the
potential for criminal prosecution. If a director could remain insulated from
civil liability under Caremark and Stone yet face criminal culpability under
state or federal law, the guidance provided by Delaware common law
regarding oversight obligations seems almost irrelevant if not bizarre.
Avoiding jail seems a far greater priority than suffering some economic
loss, which might in any case be covered by a blanket director and officer
(“D&O”) liability insurance policy.266 Indeed, as a result of the
prosecutorial shift under the Yates Memo,
allegations of director oversight conduct that would not have
been sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss in the
Caremark “bad faith/conscious disregard” context, would
nevertheless be enough for the DOJ expert to argue that the
company’s compliance program was ineffective (because of
inadequate board oversight), and for government attorneys to
persist in an investigation of potential individual or
organizational liability.267
Moreover, the imposition of criminal liability on a director would likely
trigger an exception to the business judgment rule and remove the
presumption that the director’s oversight practices comported with
common law fiduciary obligations.268 In that respect, the Delaware
common law appears rather schizophrenic: oversight practices that
arguably passed fiduciary muster retroactively fail the same test once
criminal liability attaches on other grounds.
To prevent such bizarre outcomes, Delaware common law must bend
to fit the reality of the prosecutorial climate currently facing directors and
officers. Gaining confidence in that conclusion requires a brief explication
of some various options Delaware courts and the legislature might pursue.
The first involves a simple stand-still where Delaware continues on its
common law course as if the actions of government prosecutors have no
impact on the import and application of Delaware law. The second option
involves extending the “bad faith” exception to the business judgment rule
that would proactively involve a consideration of the potential criminality
of otherwise protected oversight practices. The third, and most cogent
approach, involves enhancing the content of the common law standards
articulated in Caremark and Stone to reflect the oversight obligations
directors and officers actually face.
266
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A. Delaware Stands Its Ground
Doing nothing represents the easiest but most dangerous course for
Delaware to pursue. Retaining, unchanged, the holdings in Caremark and
Stone would cast a blind eye to the change in prosecutorial policies and
double down on the notion that directors and officers enjoy the protection
of the business judgment rule—and therefore escape civil liability—with
little oversight effort.269 To the extent a glaring incongruity develops
between the guidance Delaware fiduciary duties provide to officers and
directors and the ultimate civil and criminal liability those corporate
managers face, Delaware law will lose its place as the primary standard for
guiding corporate behavior.270
Perhaps the stand-still approach would reflect a calculation that the
Yates Memo will not have its anticipated impact and the frequency of
finding individually culpable directors and officers in both the criminal and
civil context will remain low.271 However, if Delaware gambles on this
outcome and the Yates Memo is modestly enforced, there will be a
significant gap between the standards outlined in Caremark and Stone, and
those required from officers and directors by the DOJ.272 Unlike the
application of Caremark, where directors and officers were found to not be
criminally liable for their failure to properly administer the company’s
oversight program,273 future cases could involve high-level personnel
partaking in civil trials after being found to be criminally culpable for
failing to engage in proper oversight.274 Furthermore, if the lax oversight
systems established under current Delaware law are not subject to
additional requirements, the Yates Memo’s directives for cooperation and
investigatory assistance will leave many of Delaware’s companies without
269
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sufficient systems to qualify for cooperation credits that lower their
exposure and liability.
The implications for the business community in general are also an
important consideration. As the Yates Memo is implemented, any number
of these companies’ directors and officers might be subject to criminal
liability, but remain civilly protected by the business judgment rule.
While this may be acceptable for some companies, others will seek to
conform to the law that best represents the most stringent requirements
applicable. In that case, Delaware’s reputation is likely to suffer and it
could see a decrease in the number of entities incorporating there annually.
For those companies that continue to incorporate in Delaware and adhere
to the less stringent requirements, the potential of suffering federal liability
is significant. In 2015, Delaware had 1.18 million entities incorporated
under its law.275 With such a substantial percentage of American
businesses adopting Delaware standards as their state law, many public
companies could be vulnerable to federal liability.
B. The Bad Faith Exception
A second option for Delaware is to apply the business judgment rule’s
bad faith or illegality exception.276 Delaware’s business judgment rule
includes a presumption that directors of a corporation make decisions on
“an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company.”277 However, this
presumption may be rebutted “if the plaintiff shows that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in bad faith.”278
Under these Delaware cases, the showing of illegal activity by a plaintiff
should preclude the use of the business judgment rule for protection
against personal liability.279
275
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illegality by the plaintiff—alone—should rebut the presumptions of the business judgment rule.”); see
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(June
8,
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In order for Delaware to apply the exception, it must be assumed that
the criminal proceeding against a company and its directors and officers
has already come to a conclusion by the time a civil trial commences. In
Caremark280 and Stone,281 the results of the criminal proceedings were
already known to the court when the civil trials took place under Delaware
law. Thus, the Delaware court could then determine if criminally culpable
behavior took place according to the outcome of the criminal proceedings
against the defendant and then determine if the business judgment rule
would apply in the civil proceeding.282 And of course, in Caremark and
Stone, the directors faced no liability for failed oversight despite the
rampant criminal activity afoot within the corporation.283
If a director or officer were tried criminally prior to a civil suit, a
conviction should be permissible evidence to support a finding that illegal
behavior took place when adjudicated in the civil proceeding.284 Similarly,
a criminal acquittal should not be used to prove that the individual’s
behavior was legal in a civil proceeding, and a plea bargain should not bar
a finding that the individual did not engage in illegal behavior either.285 In
each scenario, the outcome of the criminal trial should simply stand as
evidence, but the plaintiff in the criminal proceeding would have to still
mount a winning case. This would help winnow out cases that lack
sufficient evidence and prevent a deluge of derivative lawsuits from
shareholders hoping to capitalize on the lower evidentiary threshold.
In cases where a criminal proceeding has not reached its ultimate
conclusion, a corporation or potentially liable individuals could consider
requesting a stay of a related civil proceeding until after the criminal
trial.286 The decision of whether to stay a civil proceeding is likely
280
See In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 965–66 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1996) (stating that the
criminal trial outcome had already been announced to the public).
281
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 365–366 (Del. 2006) (relating that it was public knowledge
that AmSouth was being investigated and what its criminal fines were).
282
Kevin LaCroix, The Business Judgment Rule Under Attack, THE D&O DIARY (Jan. 24, 2014),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/01/articles/director-and-officer-liability/guest-post-the-businessjudgment-rule-under-attack/ [https://www.perma.cc/5H4F-K5VP].
283
See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text (describing the civil and criminal penalties
levied against Caremark and its executives); see also Stone, 911 A.2d at 365 (holding that the directors
of a company where violations of the law were occurring were not liable).
284
See Larkin & Seibler, supra note 274, at 36–38 (discussing potential benefits to prosecutors of
sharing criminal and civil investigative information).
285
See id. (discussing the importance of strengthening prosecutors’ ability to investigate and
prosecute directors who have acted illegally).
286
William Sullivan, Yates Memo: Increasing the Perils of Parallel Proceedings, LAW360
(Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/720868/yates-memo-increasing-the-perils-of-parallelproceedings [https:www.perma.cc/9MFR-RBNJ]; see also Tony Maida & Rebecca C. Martin, The
Perils of Parallel Proceedings: To Stay or Not to Stay, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMORY: FCA UPDATE
(Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.fcaupdate.com/2016/09/the-perils-of-parallel-proceedings-to-stay-or-notto-stay/ [https://www.perma.cc/LR2N-RNZR] (noting examples of stay requests for civil trials until
after the related criminal trial under the application of the False Claims Act).
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dependent in part on the amount of overlap between the facts of the related
criminal and civil trials.287 If a corporation or individual believes that the
facts support a finding of not guilty in the criminal context, then it might
be favorable to wait until after the criminal proceeding is completed.
However, if they believe that they will lose, then staying the decision
would grant plaintiffs an opportunity to use that information against them.
Regardless of the procedural complexities regarding the application of
the bad faith exception, the approach still misses the essential point that
absent some strengthening of Delaware common law oversight obligations,
the fiduciary duty framework will no longer provide relevant guidance to
officers and directors. Instead, corporate counsel will need to look to a
variety of other state and federal laws dealing with oversight obligations to
determine the minimal steps necessary to avoid civil and criminal
liability.288 Quite simply, absent significant enhancement of the current
common law standards, Delaware fiduciary principles regarding corporate
oversight obligations will get cast to the periphery of relevance.
C. Enhancing Caremark and Stone
By enhancing the oversight standards articulated Caremark and Stone,
Delaware courts could adopt a more rigorous set of guidelines for business
oversight that reflect the reality of the world directors and officers inhabit.
But what would a revamping of Caremark and Stone actually entail?
Any effort that falls short of the what the Yates Memo reflects would still
risk the obsolescence of Delaware fiduciary standards. Therefore, retaining
the preeminence of Delaware law as the guiding light of corporate
behavior, the common law standards governing corporate compliance
should closely reflect the standards for oversight stated in the
U.S. Attorney’s Manual (“USAM”), as amended in the wake of the release
of the Yates Memo.
USAM § 9-28.800 provides the provisions relating to the Yates
Memo’s Corporate Compliance Programs.289 The section states that
corporate management systems are meant to “prevent and detect
misconduct” and “ensure that corporate activities are conducted in
accordance with applicable criminal and civil laws, regulations, and
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rules.” These provisions are standard and would largely reflect even the
current law from Caremark and Stone. However, the USAM goes on to
state that “the existence of a compliance program is not sufficient, in and
of itself, to justify not charging a corporation for criminal misconduct
undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or agents.”291
This provision would require an overhaul of the first prong of Caremark,
which states in part that “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board
to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a
reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish the lack
of good faith that is necessary to condition liability.”292 Similarly, Stone’s
first prong is equally incongruent with the USAM directive, stating that a
director must “utterly fail[] to implement any reporting system or controls”
thereof to be culpable.293
In order to better reflect the Yates Memo’s directives and provide both
an adequate warning and establish a proper floor for a Delaware company
to abide by federal law, the Delaware courts would have to engage in a
qualitative analysis of the oversight system that is in place. Although
engaging in such substantive review certainly represents a shift in how the
common law presumption of the business judgment rule gets applied,
permitting the floor for oversight activity to remain so insubstantial is
incongruent with the USAM requirements. Nonetheless, no need for
violent jurisprudential shockwaves exists. With a narrow set of facts
related specifically to egregious oversight (arguably subject to criminal
liability in the federal prosecutorial context), the exception for willful
blindness under Stone could be expanded quite easily.294
Luckily, Delaware courts are well suited to engage in such a far-reaching
endeavor based on their structure and ability to create judge-made law.295
Indeed, the Delaware courts often instigate reform outside the legislative
process in order to ensure the efficiency and efficacy of standards guiding
business practices.296
To provide additional direction to the Delaware court in conceiving the
language of the new rule, the USAM provides two factors of analysis used
to evaluate any oversight program.297 First, is whether “the program is
adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in preventing and
detecting wrongdoing by employees.”298 Second, is whether the corporate
290
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management is “enforcing the program or is tacitly encouraging or
pressuring employees to engage in misconduct to achieve business
objectives.”299 Taken together, these two factors require active engagement
with the oversight system implemented by a company in order to even
begin an analysis of whether director and officers are potentially liable.
The second factor is especially relevant to addressing the second prong
of Stone, which required a director or officer to “consciously fail[] to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”300 Under the
second factor of the USAM, the second prong of Stone would be
insufficient in its oversight requirements. Instead, directors and officers
would be expected to enforce the program and react quickly and decisively
to stop any perceived misconduct.
The degree to which Delaware wholly adopts the USAM directives
would depend on the apparent vulnerability of the companies subject to the
new regulatory framework. If the Yates Memo is seen as being applicable
to every company equally, then Delaware should take great care to adopt a
broad version of the USAM standard. If the Yates Memo is only likely to
apply to corporations within the Fortune 500, Delaware can adjust the
language of the resulting rule to exclude closely held entities and those that
have only minute oversight liability.
Ultimately, the best alternative for Delaware would be to enhance
significantly the oversight standards articulated in Caremark and Stone. By
adopting more robust oversight requirements that mirror the Yates Memo’s
requirements, Delaware would offer the best protection for companies
incorporated in the state with fewer obstacles than the other two
alternatives. Not engaging in any fiduciary law reform leaves Delaware
companies extremely vulnerable to liability under the Yates Memo’s new
directives. Also, failing to react to the new policies could cause Delaware’s
law to become irrelevant as corporate counsel realize they cannot protect
their clients by seeking the flimsy umbrella of protection afforded under
the business judgment rule.301
In addition, the prospect of using the illegality exception to the
business judgment rule has weaknesses. First, there may be evidentiary
obstacles to using the evidence or convictions from criminal proceedings
against defendants in civil trials. For example, under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e), criminal prosecutors are generally precluded
from sharing evidence garnered during a grand jury hearing with civil
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prosecutors. Another consideration is the use of strategic stays to protect
the over extension of access to evidence through discovery. Due to the
more expansive scope of the civil discovery process when compared to the
criminal discovery process, defendants might attempt to use a stay in the
civil proceeding so that the criminal proceeding is not tainted by evidence
that would not be otherwise discoverable.303 Second, there are potential
concerns relating to the manner in which the civil and criminal
investigations might interact.304 For the DOJ, the ability to rely on the two
investigatory bodies is a great benefit and helps increase efficiency.
However, from a business’s perspective, the prospect of abiding by the
Yates Memo’s cooperation policies in order to receive credit in a criminal
proceeding only to have the information that is disclosed be used against it
in the civil context will make the new system untenable. It would be much
more likely that corporations would decide to go silent and not engage in
any exchange of information in order to avoid potentially incurring liability
on both the civil and criminal fronts.305
Under Delaware’s more rigorous, new standard, the obligation for
officers and directors to actively engage in the oversight process could
generate positive benefits for companies of all sizes.306 The board and
management would be far more likely to be aware of any issues that
present risks to the company if the failure to monitor or oversee operations
exposed directors and officers to personal liability. This is true whether the
entity is large or small because the obligation is the same across the board.
Further, if the company identified an internal scandal, it would be in
position to address it immediately rather than having it linger and
potentially spread. This could preclude subsequent investigations or suits
under the Yates Memo’s new terms simply by addressing the problem
before it reached a critical mass.
302
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The new standard would also bolster Delaware’s business judgment
rule jurisprudence and perform the standard-setting function that is
currently missing. Perhaps most importantly, the rules create a synergy
between the obligations expected from the Delaware courts and the federal
regulatory entities. The likelihood that a director or officer would be
subject to criminal liability under federal law and be protected by the
business judgment rule under Delaware law is greatly diminished.
While there may be costs to the Delaware court system initially, the
eventual changes that will occur when directors and officers prioritize
business oversight from a preemptive perspective, instead of a reactive
perspective, are significant.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Enhancing Delaware’s common law standards regarding compliance
and oversight would produce significant advantages for the public,
Delaware corporations, and officers and directors. Although some risks
certainly exist as well,307 the drawbacks fail to tip the scale in favor of
jurisprudential stasis.
A. More Successful Prosecutions of Individuals
Under a system that effectively melds the federal standards outlined in
the Yates Memo and the Delaware common law regarding managerial
oversight, it will be more likely that criminal prosecutions of individuals
will result in guilty verdicts. The reason for this is twofold. First, as the
new Delaware standard is accounted for in board rooms throughout the
country, companies are more likely to incorporate stronger, more effective
oversight systems in order to comply with the law.308 These systems will
be better suited to identify problems in a company’s operations and will
also alert the board and directors to misconduct among low-level and
middle-level employees. Because these employees’ liability is often easier
to identify,309 more mundane infractions will be discovered, addressed
internally, and reported voluntarily based on the desire to benefit from
307
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cooperation credit.
As these systems winnow down the number of
actionable instances of misconduct, the DOJ is more likely to engage in
investigations of alleged misconduct against companies that have
committed serious offenses simply because the other, less-severe actions
are more easily identified and handled by the entity itself.311
Second, in sharp contrast, the companies that are most vulnerable are
those that do not have compliance systems or have systems that are so
mismanaged, neglected, or dysfunctional that they offer no benefit to either
the entity by deterring and identifying misbehavior or to DOJ investigators
as a benefit used to grant cooperation credit.312 As such, these companies
and their directors and officers are far more likely to fall victim to the
investigatory pitfalls outlined, which the Yates Memo seeks to punish.
These directors and officers are also less likely to prevail at trial because
they will not benefit from cooperation credits and their internal
investigations will reap less useful evidence than those entities with
established systems.313
The DOJ is also likely to become more efficient in its investigatory
process as time passes. By encouraging companies to have strong,
established business oversight policies, the DOJ is facilitating the oversight
process and also setting the table for internal investigations. For those
companies that comply and still encounter problems, the DOJ will have a
streamlined set of standards that they can use to review the company’s
actions and determine who knew what and when, resulting in more
personal liability with less work for DOJ personnel. By engaging and
benefitting from a company’s own investigatory resources, the DOJ also
saves time and money at the initial stages of a prosecution. Ultimately, this
will result in culpable individuals within the company being subject to
personal liability on both the civil and criminal fronts.
B. Increased Investor Confidence
The stakes are also high for the market under the new standard.
Delaware law has enormous implications for public companies traded on
the global financial markets. Historically, investor confidence ebbs and
flows based on the latest corporate scandal that comes to light and thus
310
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erodes investor confidence.
By adopting clearly articulated and
reasonable standards, companies can better adapt their policies to the rules
of the game. This will create more stability and over time, lower the
number of market-shaking scandals. By actively engaging in oversight and
in some cases, hiring compliance personnel to prevent misconduct,
companies might also use their clean records as a means of showing their
investors that they are trustworthy and engaging in business the right
way.315
As major corporate scandals have shown, the financial markets are
becoming increasingly inaccessible to the lower and middle classes.316 Part
of this stems from a lack of confidence in corporate management to do the
right thing and address serious issues before massive legal expenses are
incurred and regulatory fines are levied. Instead, a select few collect a
disproportionate amount of the wealth and common stakeholders are left to
pick up the costs for misconduct in the form of legal fees, fines, and
settlements.317 This all-too-frequent problem betrays the notion that society
confers special benefits upon corporations with the idea that they exist for
legal convenience and not for the purposes of engaging in unregulated
misconduct and abuse.318 By using criminal and civil law in tandem as
314
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dependable deterrent devices to restore the equilibrium between corporate
and societal benefits, investors may slowly return to the market and
reintroduce capital that has been used elsewhere in recent years.319
C. Increased Efficiency in Delaware Law
Enhancing the content of Delaware fiduciary duties regarding
managerial oversight and compliance will necessarily enhance corporate
efficiency. Efficient corporate governance rules reflect what corporate
managers, shareholders, and other non-shareholder constituencies would
hypothetically negotiate in a world of perfect information, freedom of
contract, and zero transaction costs.320 Of course, the reality of our world
prevents those conditions from being obtained. As a result, determining the
content of the hypothetical bargain presents quite a challenge.
Even if the precise outcome of the bargain remains a mystery,
however, maintaining a corporate culture that prevents employees and
other corporate agents from producing negative externalities eventually
borne by shareholders necessarily makes an efficient outcome more
likely.321 Why? If corporate managers are able to engage in illegal activity
without any reproach from investors, they will have no incentive to avoid
nefarious actions when determining which corporate path to pursue. On the
other hand, the vulnerability to shareholder action made possible by more
stringent common law oversight standards provides the opposite incentive
to consider thoughtfully actual shareholder preferences. To the extent
corporate rules facilitate the consideration of actual shareholder interests
(whether on corporate oversight practices or any other concern), corporate
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2661 (2008). However, when the corporate form is used for abuse,
corporate actors betray the responsibilities that accompany the grant of the special rights described
above.
319
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generally Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1201–03 (1999) (describing the areas expanded social
disclosure ideally would include).
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Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 989 (2014) (arguing that
mandatory disclosure cuts costs because it reduces the cost of shareholder monitoring and serves as
support for the shareholders role of corporate governance); David A. Westbrook, Telling All: The
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managers more closely track the true preferences of shareholders rather
than some stilted idea of shareholders’ interest only in wealth
maximization.322 Because some shareholders possess (intense) preferences
for a variety of environmental, social, or other political commitments
related to compliance and oversight, ignoring the reality of their
preferences in shaping corporate governance rules disconnects the content
of the rule from what real parties to the bargain ultimately desire. An
enhanced corporate compliance rule would more effectively engage
corporate managers in a dialogue with shareholders about the extent to
which corporations should even engage in oversight, perhaps even in
excess of what current prosecutorial standards entail.323 Through enhanced
discourse that pays adequate fidelity to the interests of affected corporate
constituencies, an efficient outcome regarding the content of corporate
governance rules becomes more likely.
D. Delaware Remains Relevant
The final implication for the adoption of the new standards and
increased synergy of the state and federal laws is that Delaware will remain
relevant. As currently structured, fiduciary standards regarding corporate
oversight offer little concrete guidance on what ultimately insulates
directors and officers from liability. Without any bite, the business
judgment rule does little to encourage companies to identify and quell acts
of misconduct. As a result, public confidence in the justice system and
investor confidence in the capital markets declines. By enhancing its
common law standards for corporate compliance, Delaware could reclaim
its place as the model for corporate law. Rather than being viewed as a
governing structure that permits rampant illegality, the business judgment
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stakeholder and shareholder interests in corporate decision making).

2018]

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND CRIMINALITY

441

rule could be revamped as a tool to provide meaningful guidance in
preventing corporate calamities and scandals.
CONCLUSION
The time to forge a new standard for business oversight liability has
come in the form of the Yates Memo. The Delaware decisions in
Caremark and Stone represent outdated standards that no longer provide a
clear roadmap to business managers for evading civil or criminal liability.
Modest changes could be made, however, that would align common law
standards with the prevailing prosecutorial climate aimed at eradicating
corporate criminality. In the end, redirecting Delaware common law
fiduciary duties to follow federal prosecution standards will better ensure
corporate accountability, render the common law more efficient, and
restore public trust in the justice system and capital markets.

